Evolution of political manifestos with a study of proposals to reform the House of Lords in the 20th century by Kangis, Peter
 1 
         
Evolution of Political Manifestos with a study of 
proposals to Reform the House of Lords in the 
20th Century. 
 
 
 
 
by Peter KANGIS 
Ref. 1840593 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
Submitted to Kingston University in part fulfillment of the requirements for the 
degree of Master of Science by Research. 
16 July 2019. 
 2 
Abstract 
This is a study of how electoral Manifestos have evolved in the 20th century, with a 
special case study of how Manifesto undertakings in one policy area, that of Reform of 
the House of Lords, have been delivered by a party when in government. An 
examination of the Manifestos issued by the Labour, Conservative and Liberal parties for 
the 27 elections between 1900 and 2001 shows a substantial increase in size on various 
dimensions and a certain convergence between the parties in their approach to 
presentational characteristics. A statistical analysis of the overall set of data collected 
could not confirm that the variations observed were not due to chance. Examination of 
the relationship between pledges in Manifestos and action taken to reform the House of 
Lords shows that these pledges were neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
reform to take place. Several reforms have been introduced which had not been pledged 
in electoral Manifestos whilst several pledges put forward have not been followed up. 
The study is making several modest contributions to the literature and is highlighting a 
few areas where further research could be undertaken. 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this project is to examine a number of dimensions of political Manifestos as 
they have evolved over a period of time, to compare submissions of different political 
parties and then to test the extent to which undertakings in Manifestos link with 
government action in one specific policy area: the Reform of the House of Lords. 
Shortly before the general election of 1997 hard copies of the latest Manifesto by the 
Labour Party were in general circulation, where Tony Blair put forward pledges as to 
what he would be delivering if Labour were to win that election. The expression “New 
Labour” started appearing more frequently in the press but at the same time a few critics 
described that Manifesto’s content as “all things to all men” (inspired by: 1 Corinthians, 
9:22). Of particular interest was the statement (196 words) as to how Labour would 
reform the House of Lords. The outcome of that election was a landslide victory for 
Labour, attracting 43.2% of the national vote and claiming 63.4% of the seats in the 
House of Commons, thus presenting a clear Parliamentary majority of 179 seats. This 
was an opportunity for Tony Blair, the Prime Minister, to be adventurous in what his 
government would undertake and more confident that proposals put forward would be 
seen through the law-making procedures in Parliament. The Conservative and Liberal 
Parties also distributed leaflets with excerpts from their Manifestos, but these were only 
short extracts and bullet-point summaries, subjectively deemed by the present writer as 
fairly unimpressive in the form presented, particularly when compared with the Labour 
Manifesto, which could not be overlooked easily. Informal enquiries about post-electoral 
intentions regarding the House of Lords (policy area chosen as a specific case study), at 
the local constituency level, and also though the national headquarters of the three 
larger parties, did not go very far; there was little enthusiasm at that time for academic 
enquiries. The competing discourse of the day was the “Millennium Bug” and the 
ensuing threat of a possible “destruction of civilisation” (believed to originate in The 
Telegraph, but it has not been possible to pinpoint the reference).  
An initial search of the literature did not yield substantial studies on the dimensions of 
Manifestos, both in comparative terms between the parties and about their evolution 
over time. Also, studies of how specific policy areas have been addressed in Manifestos 
are particularly scarce in the literature. The present enquiry aims to address this broad 
gap by revisiting the purposes and evolution of Manifestos. Will be examined, inter alia, 
how sundry variables in Manifestos differ between political parties, how these 
dimensions have evolved over time, how the parties, through their Manifestos, have 
pledged action on reform of the House of Lords and the extent to which these 
undertakings were delivered. Given the breadth of areas that need to be addressed and 
after considering the resources required for this investigation, it was decided to adopt an 
exploratory forensic approach, not underpinned by any one specific theory.  
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1.1 Where does this Enquiry fit? 
Study of the Manifestos will be confined to what was published by the three mainstream 
political parties in the UK before each general election during the 20th century. In this 
respect, this enquiry will be forensic and not constrained by any one specific theoretical 
approach.  
Relating the specific case of reform of the Lords with what is pledged in political party 
Manifestos could be guided by several disciplines, only some of which are considered 
here. Given that the Lords have a fundamental contribution to the making of law in the 
UK, any reform which affects the powers, decision-making or composition of the Lords 
and anything else which touches upon their law-making role, procedures, conventions, 
rights and duties, would fit in to the broad area of Constitutional Law or in the general 
domain of Public Law, as exemplified in Hand (2014). Politics being a process by which 
society decides what it values and how resources should be distributed (White, 1994, 
p.5), reshaping of the institutions of government relates to political theory and context.  
Political Science would thus have a legitimate contribution to the study of reform, as 
illustrated by Kelso (2013). There is also room for an eclectic approach, which avoids 
making a choice between many of the polarities current in theory and methodology 
(Silverman, 1994, vii). Instinctively, a positivist approach to research would come to 
mind. A paradigm encompassing hypothetico-deductive methodologies would have 
satisfied the norms of historically “received” sound research and possibly made a 
contribution to knowledge. But which is the knowledge-base which will be added upon? 
Quoting Kant (Landesman, 1997, p.2) “we can know things as they appear to us, and 
the picture of the world that we form on the basis of the appearances is constructed 
according to categories of thought that pay no respect to things in themselves”. 
In general terms, no single discipline is likely to address fully the areas of concern about 
a link between Manifestos and action on reform of the Lords. Several overlapping areas 
of scholarship need to be accessed with a view to enhancing understanding. The 
present investigation is seeking the assistance of a variety of academic disciplines, using 
them as guides along the research process, in their creative contributions, and not as 
shackles. In epistemological terms, acceptance of a pragmatic theory would lead to: “if it 
works, it is true” (Cole, 2002, pp.50-55), independently of the narrowness or breadth of a 
context and of the discipline which has guided it. The approach is largely forensic, 
selectively guided by a combination of political science, constitutional law, decision 
making and political economy. Apart from these guides, this enquiry will remain non-
parametric and will not aim for prediction (Toulmin, 1966 p.25 et seq.) but will be based 
on historical data (Marshall & Rossman, 1995, p.41). It is recognised that in the social 
sciences there is some difficulty to constructing a research problem in simple terms 
(Thiétard, 2001, p.41 et seq.). The answer to the question “what am I looking for?” leads 
to an interpretative research approach (Thiétard, 2001, p.31), with explanations limited 
by both the paucity and the scatter of information and the incompleteness of the context 
within which facts have shaped decisions and actions.  
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The research orientation of this project is empirico-inductive (Majchrzak, 1984, p.18 & 
p.103), where “concepts and causal theories are induced from the empirical dynamic 
study of the social phenomenon”. The enquiry begins with observations and aims to 
suggest possible areas of generalisation (White, 1994, p.47), rather than be based on à 
priory assumptions (Patton, 2002, p.125) (but it is accepted that some assumptions are 
inevitable). Theory will be a guide, called upon to help when needed, and not a rigid 
algorithm. A fairly comprehensive review and analysis of theories related to or competing 
with a grounded theory approach will be found in Goulding (2005), Corbin & Strauss 
(1990), Locke (2005) and Glaser & Holston (2007). In Argument and Evidence, Phelan & 
Reynolds (1966, p.154 et seq.); highlight that in the social sciences, induction and 
deduction inform each other in sequence, without a rigid template as to which one is the 
starting point. Barnes (1974, p. 46 et seq.) calls this situation the “non experimental 
nature of some sciences” and the “unobservable unique past events” for which “no 
single convention has guided scientific methodology, or even ex post facto successful 
scientific methodology”. Notwithstanding the limitations of the approach adopted, 
analysis of past events relating to how a policy area has been treated in political 
Manifestos and how it was implemented should make a contribution not only to 
methodology but also to theory formation in this broad and un-pinned down subject area.   
For the present project it was decided to focus observations to about 100 years of 
change. It was thought that a longitudinal study of this length would provide a sufficient 
pool of information for patterns, if any, to be identified and brought to the surface. It was 
also thought that a much longer period of analysis would have probably required 
different approaches, both at the epistemological level and in the areas where this study 
may contribute. The period of 1900-2001 was chosen as it satisfies several practical 
considerations. It includes 27 general elections, thus 27 opportunities for the parties 
formally to make public their proposals through their Manifestos. A sample size of 27 
allows several basic statistical tests to be applied and thus contributes to reducing the 
likelihood of doubtful conclusions being drawn. Informed statistical testing helps 
“separate knowledge from opinion” (Greco & Sosa, 1999, p.6). Statistics will be used 
both for descriptive purposes and, where appropriate, inferentially. The period of 1900-
2001 is also useful in that a greater volume of accessible recorded information is 
available than for earlier times in history and encompasses a period when major 
changes were proposed for the Lords. On the other hand, the exponential growth of 
material and interest in specific policy areas, such as the reform of the Lords, place 
undue weight on what is happening today and the dynamics of recent times. Sheer 
volume and noise tone down attention to earlier concerns, contexts and circumstances. 
For this reason, it was decided to conclude the investigation with the general election of 
2001. The rapid expansion and penetration of the new media and of its use by political 
parties, the quasi-logarithmic increase in the broad literature, and the minute-by-minute 
coverage in the media, advocate against the mingling together of information spread 
broadly in recent times with what was cast to the public in yesteryear.  Messages and 
pamphlets in Sir Robert Peel’s times would have taken several days to reach parts of the 
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electorate, compared with the milliseconds (quasi real-time) that messages would take 
to reach any part of the world at the close of the 20th century.  
 
2. About Manifestos 
2.1 What is a Manifesto? 
The noun Manifesto is etymologically linked to the Latin manifestum, meaning evident or 
conspicuous. In the English language the expression first appeared in the translation by 
Nathaniel Brent (ca. 1620) of Fra. Paolo Sarpi’s History of the Council of Trent. The 
earliest modern application of the expression in England is in what is commonly known 
as the Tamworth Manifesto, which was in the form of a letter by Sir Robert Peel 
addressed to his constituents on 18 December 1834, just before the 1835 general 
election. Peel had just accepted the King’s (William IV) invitation to form a minority 
government to replace the administration of Lord Melbourne (a Whig). The letter 
consisted of 2391 words (Bloy, 2018) and is shown in Appendix 10. Other styles of 
Manifesto would include the Declaration of Independence of the United States (1776), 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789) during the French Revolution, 
and the Communist Manifesto (1848) by Marx and Engels. General commentary on 
Manifestos can be found in Quinn (2017). 
According to the Glossary page at  www.parliament.uk  (last accessed 9 Apr 2019), “A 
manifesto is a publication issued by a political party before a General Election. 
It contains the set of policies that the party stands for and would wish, or intends, to 
implement if elected to govern”. An earlier definition in The Random House Dictionary of 
the English Language, Unabridged Edition, 1967, defines a Manifesto as “a public 
declaration of intentions, opinions, objectives, or motives, as when issued by a 
government, sovereign, or organization”. Given overlaps in the literature, it should be 
noted that in the USA a political Manifesto is often called a party platform or electoral 
platform. 
There is sufficient consensus in the literature that a political Manifesto is a statement of 
intent, by a political party, issued just prior to elections, forming a part of its overall 
communications strategy. It sets out the practical and philosophical direction the party 
intends to follow as well as the legislation that it will enact, if it is called upon to form the 
next government. It seems reasonable to expect the party winning an election to be 
guided by its own Manifesto, yet “Politicians don’t make promises as part of some 
bargain with their voters, as a quid pro quo. They make promises to signal their political 
philosophy, their ideology” (Martinned blog, 2012).  
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2.2 The Salisbury Convention 
It is generally accepted in British politics that legislative proposals originating in an 
electoral Manifesto carry greater legitimacy in Parliament than measures that do not. In 
the UK, under the Salisbury (or Salisbury-Addison) Doctrine (or Convention), it is 
generally expected that the “House of Lords should not get in the way of the 
implementation of government Manifesto commitments for which (by definition) the 
government had a “mandate” from the electorate” (Elliott, 2017b) or  “promised” in its 
election Manifesto (Parliament UK, 2014) . This convention was generally considered to 
be a “convention that conditioned the relationship between two chambers [House of 
Lords and House of Commons], rather than (as it had originally been) a compact 
between two political parties” (Elliott, 2017b) [Further comment in Dymond & Deadman 
(2006) and McLean (2011)]. Given that this convention, which, self-evidently, is a 
convention and not a law, the determination of how binding it is, is a “highly inexact 
science” (Elliott, 2017b).  
Periodically, and prompted by circumstances, the discourse extends on to whether or 
not there is compulsion in the delivery of a Manifesto in the case of a minority 
government or in a coalition formed after a general election has taken place. The 
literature on Manifestos leads to the conclusion that such cases may be considered as 
falling outside the spirit of the Salisbury Convention (see, for example, Vince Cable’s 
comments in Cowling, 2015). Manifesto undertakings remain of some interest, and for 
the occasional misuse by politicians, but they are not pedantically relevant in such 
situations. Where a one-party government is formed, the Salisbury Convention is 
expected to apply.  
 
2.2 Commitment to content of political electoral Manifestos 
The direct election by voters of individuals, from which group a government will be 
formed, ensures strong bonds of accountability (but there are exceptions, such as the 
case of an unelected member of the House of Lords being appointed to a position in 
Government). Manifestos link the pre-election statements with a democratically 
mandated post-election obligation and legitimacy (Quinn, 2014), but there are many 
unanswered questions. By way of illustration: is a statement made in an electoral 
Manifesto committing the party that made it? In other words: is winning an election both 
a right and an obligation to implement the content of a Manifesto? Conversely, is an 
action undertaken by a party in government frowned upon if it has not been pre-signalled 
in a Manifesto? What challenge, if any, is open against a government which is not 
adhering to the letter or spirit of its own party’s Manifesto? If a Manifesto is a binding 
promise, who is the promise made by and who would have a standing to take legal 
action? Could the complainant be any interested party, such as a citizen or voter in 
general, or is it that complaints have to be limited to those who can demonstrate that 
they were led by the contents of the Manifesto to vote for a particular party? Is the 
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complaining party expected to show some loss, financial or otherwise? Martinned (2012) 
suggests that under normal private law in the UK, only people who relied on the contents 
of a Manifesto and voted for a particular party would qualify. The position of the Court in 
the recent case of Boris Johnson being sued for promoting Brexit by using incorrect 
information, would probably discourage attempts at litigation. This particular private 
prosecution case was brought forward not as a breach of contract but rather as 
“misconduct in public office” and was dismissed by the High Court. Similarly, if legal 
action were possible, who would it be against? Who would be the culpable party (in the 
legal sense) if Manifesto pledges were ignored by a political party once in government? 
Would it be against a particular Member of Parliament, a Minister, the Cabinet in 
collective responsibility, the political party which published the Manifesto, the party in 
government or the government in general? What if a Bill were introduced in keeping with 
the Manifesto but was voted against by the House of Commons? What if passed by the 
Commons and blocked by the Lords? [Commentary in the Guardian-on-line (2017)]. 
Judging by the content of a multitude of blogs on the Internet [see sample reference:  
Debate (2013)], the weight of opinion leads to the expectation that electoral Manifestos 
are to be delivered, but it is unlikely that they can be treated as legally binding. It is a 
“moral responsibility [which] must be made legally enforceable” (Kumar, 2004). There 
remains a general anticipation that, when in government, a party will act within the spirit 
of its electoral Manifesto (Barra, 2005). It is “one of the most important assumptions 
underlying this view of British politics since 1945” and “(T)he winning party was assumed 
to have a mandate to implement its Manifesto in office” (Quinn, 2014). And, “The party 
that won a majority of seats in parliament would have a mandate to implement the 
Manifesto. That is, it would have both the right and the obligation to do so.” But this 
matter has not been raised and settled in the courts. Taking, for example, Tony Blair’s 
statement in the Labour Manifesto for 1997 (p.1, line 13) “This is my contract with the 
people”, is there really a commitment? by whom, to whom and for what? 
Elliott (2017a) in a post on Public Law for Everyone concludes that “Manifestos are 
merely prospectuses. Many of the promises made in them are never implemented, or 
are implemented only in a loosely recognisable form. After all, with one notable 
exception, Manifesto commitments are not engraved in stone, and are inevitably 
susceptible to the vagaries of political and other developments that cannot be foreseen”.  
The stone referred to by Elliot (2017a) is the so-called EdStone. This was a large stone 
tablet commissioned by the Labour Party for the general election of 2015. Six election 
pledges were written on it, together with the signature of Ed Miliband, the then Leader of 
the Labour Party.  
• A strong economic foundation 
• Higher living standards for working families 
• A National Health Service with the time to care 
• Controls on immigration 
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• A country where the next generation can do better than the last 
• Homes to buy and action on rents 
Labour did not do well at that election, the stone was much mocked. John Rentoul, for 
example, Tony Blair’s biographer, described it as the "most absurd, ugly, embarrassing, 
childish, silly, patronising, ridiculous gimmick I have ever seen" (Rentoul, in Wikipedia),  
It happens that the Labour Party did not declare the cost of the stone as part of what it 
had expended towards that election and, as a result, was fined by the Electoral 
Commission. 
 
2.3 Are the undertakings in Manifestos being delivered? 
Quinn (2014) asserts that “Manifestos were an important hinge, linking pre-election 
promises with democratically mandated post-election governance”.  This expectation or 
wish for Manifestos to be considered as binding has to be partly offset by concern about 
the rigidity of any undertaking made before a party gets in government. Even though civil 
servants are meant to be even-handed between parties in the information that they 
make available, it is appreciated that a party in opposition might not have a sufficiently 
reliable and comprehensive picture of the country’s political economy so as to commit 
itself to priorities and formulate policy on a particular issue until after it has been in 
power for some time. There is also the need for flexibility in the light of a constantly 
changing economic and political climate both within the United Kingdom and in the rest 
of the world. In any case, “once in office politicians are frequently struck by amnesia” 
(Haig, 2002, p.212), or, in the present writer’s opinion, they could even be overwhelmed 
by the reality of a situation. 
BBC (2017) made reference to a Manifesto Tracker which “tracks the progress the 
government is making- or not- in achieving the promises made by the Conservatives in 
their 2015 general election Manifesto and general policy announcements”. The BBC 
report claimed that, out of 161 policy areas listed in the Manifesto, so far (to 2017), no 
progress had been made towards the delivery of 16 of these areas (9.9%). On another 
90 areas (55.9%), policy had not yet been delivered but some progress was being made 
towards its delivery. On 55 areas (34.2%), policy had been delivered. Given that only 20 
months separated the election (May 2015) from the publication of that report (January 
2017), it could be argued that progress had not been bad, particularly since a part of the 
political time had focused on the debate and Referendum about membership of the 
European Union. It has to be stressed, however, that there is no formal classification for 
the division of policy areas and neither a norm nor an accepted yardstick as to what 
would constitute good progress or delivery, and in whose opinion. Further work in this 
area would be welcome. 
A Performance Tracker, published by the Institute for Government (2017), examined the 
general performance of the government in a number of policy areas. Through 
comparison with the Manifesto Tracker a view can be formed as to the extent to which 
government has been achieving what it was supposed to be committed to in the 
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preceding Manifesto. The overlap of topics and methodological approaches between the 
two trackers is limited but, if publication of these two reports were to be continued, they 
should provide an interesting basis for political analysis and comparison.    
 
2.4 What happens when a Manifesto undertaking is not delivered? 
Does a pre-electoral pledge by a senior politician count as an integral part of a 
Manifesto? Prior to the 2010 general election, Nicholas Clegg MP, the then leader of the 
Liberal Democrats, signed the Vote for Students pledge (“I pledge to vote against any 
increase in fees in the next parliament and to pressure the government to introduce a 
fairer alternative”). When the Liberal Democrats joined the Conservative Party to form a 
coalition government, they had to abandon their pledge to oppose any increase in tuition 
fees, but gained permission to abstain on any vote relating to an increase. Mr Clegg 
wrote to his MPs to say that he had "struggled endlessly" with the issue and said that 
departing from the pledge he had made prior to the election would be "one of the most 
difficult decisions of my political career". Both Mr Clegg and the Liberal Democrats were 
widely criticised for not honouring that pledge. During an interview on 24 October 2010 
with the BBC (Andrew Marr programme) Mr Clegg said that he "regretted" not being able 
to keep his pre-election policy to scrap tuition fees but claimed that this was the result of 
the financial situation the country had found itself in. On 19 September 2012, Mr Clegg 
apologised, not for breaking his pledge, but for having "made a promise we weren’t 
absolutely sure we could deliver". Thus, if this pledge were to be treated in the same 
way as a statement in a Manifesto, Mr Clegg (2010) demonstrated that this commitment 
could be ignored if circumstances so dictated.  
A further case, one that actually did go to Court, was when the Labour Government of 
Tony Blair declined to hold a Referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. Labour had previously 
undertaken in the Manifesto for the 2005 election to hold a Referendum on the proposed 
Constitution Treaty of the European Union, but work on this treaty did not proceed due to 
its rejection by France and the Netherlands. With several modifications the Constitution 
Treaty evolved into the Lisbon Treaty. The case R (on the application of Stuart Wheeler) 
v Office of the Prime Minister et al., was heard on 25 June 2008 (report by Caroline 
Sweeney, Monckton Chambers, 25 June 2008). In this case, Mr Wheeler claimed that 
the promise made in the Labour Manifesto: “We will put it to the British people in a 
referendum and campaign whole-heartedly for a ‘Yes’ vote to keep Britain a leading 
nation in Europe”, was not delivered .The Court considered the case and gave judgment 
in favour of the defendants, explaining that the legal complaint failed for several reasons. 
The most important of these was that the Lisbon Treaty and the Constitution Treaty were 
quite different in several respects, so that an undertaking in relation to one of them could 
not be held as an undertaking in relation to the other. It is surprising that the Court went 
as far as to comment on a comparison of the two treaties and to declare that they were 
different. The Court also declined to be drawn in to matters pertaining to politics and that 
“the question whether the government should be held to such a promise is a political 
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rather than a legal matter”. The Court also held that getting involved in such matters 
would be interfering in the proceedings of Parliament, one of the Judges declaring that 
“this case is politics dressed up as law”.  Effectively “this conclusion removed that case 
from the hands of the Court and [as a result] it shed little light in relation to enforceability 
of Manifesto pledges through the legal system in the United Kingdom”. Statements like 
the following are abundant: “you can’t sue politicians for breaking their election 
promises”; “can politicians ever be forced to keep their promises?”; “none of them have 
any legal obligation to fulfil these pledges” and “why judges will never force them to do 
so.” Thus wrote Dodds (2015) in the Politics Blog.  
So, it seems unlikely that legal action will succeed even if raised by entities who consider 
themselves aggrieved because a government did not deliver the Manifesto on which the 
party was voted in. Notwithstanding this view, and in the absence of any other evidence, 
performance close to the pledges of a Manifesto is expected and will therefore remain 
an assumption in this project. As said earlier (Barra, 2005), Manifesto  
“... statements are so general that it would be difficult not to find any evidence of 
fulfilment” [and the reciprocal, of non-fulfilment] and make it difficult to determine the 
extent to which an objective had been achieved or is still wanting. In the absence of 
evidence though a comprehensive analysis, it would not be unreasonable to assume 
that there is so much contained in a Manifesto and that what is there is couched in 
words that would often make it likely that at least a part, however small, of whatever has 
been pledged would be delivered, and, of course, the reciprocal, that some of the 
pledges would not be delivered. Disaffected expectations would need to wait until the 
next general election, when the matter can be settled via the ballot box: “in the mandate 
doctrine, voters must trust governing parties to implement their Manifesto pledges, but if 
they don’t, voters must wait till the next election to punish them” (Quinn, 2014). Concern 
about discrepancies between Manifesto pledges and delivery is likely to assume greater 
importance when the party in government has a safe majority in the House of Commons. 
Should this be the case, it is assumed that the party would be better able to act in 
keeping with the spirit or the letter of what has been pledged and which might have 
contributed to placing it in government. An interesting comparison between British and 
American attitudes towards Manifestos as mandates will be found in Royed (1996). 
There is, of course, an important assumption being made, that Manifestos represent the 
wants and wishes of the electorate, but this will remain an assumption until evidence 
supports or refutes it empirically and the electorate has expressed its choice (Pennings 
& Keman, 2002; Adams et al., 2004).  
 
It is not unusual for parties to backtrack in the presence of public outcry when an attempt 
is made to introduce legislation going against the spirit or the letter of a Manifesto. Philip 
Hammond, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, attempted to increase National Insurance 
Contributions for a certain class of business (METRO, 2017, and Sands M et al, in City 
A.M., 2017) but soon found it necessary to make a U-turn by redefining the application of 
his proposals in a way which circumvented the offending intention. Also note Vince 
Cable’s comments in Cowling (2017). As Norman Lamont (2017), a previous Chancellor 
 14 
of the Exchequer, said: “Election pledges should not be lightly given...and tax pledges 
cannot be lightly cast aside”. David Cameron, reported in Hope & Swinford (2017), 
“Breaking a Manifesto promise- how stupid can you get” ...It is thus suspected that 
interpretation and importance given to a Manifesto pledge as a commitment, is very 
much in the hands of the party that has made it. 
 
Making a Manifesto a legally binding commitment between a party and the electorate 
has been a frequent proposal. Hattenstone (2015) in The Guardian has suggested that 
failure to deliver a pledge in a Manifesto should trigger a general election. Petitions have 
claimed that “Manifesto promises are regularly not being kept to and are being used 
simply as a gateway to get into power” (Wormald in 38 Degrees, undated) and have 
been submitted by the public at large on numerous occasions, without success.  A public 
petition asks for a change to the law or to government policy. After collection of 10,000 
signatures, petitions get a direct response from the government. After 100,000 
signatures, petitions are considered for debate in Parliament (Petitions, 2016). But it is 
thought that a change in the meaning and status of Manifestos is so important that it is 
most unlikely that petitions would be a route for change. 
 
2.5 Qualitative evaluation of Party Manifestos 
Over the decades a variety of partly subjective evaluations have been reported in the 
press. The relevance of these to the role of Manifestos in the polity remains to be 
developed and the methodology adopted itself evaluated (BBC, 2017). By way of 
examples: 
How future thinking are Manifestos? Nesta (2015a) compared the Manifestos for 2010 
with those of 2015 for seven political parties and concluded that the more recent 
Manifestos were less future thinking than those for 2010. Their future-thinking 
measurement consisted of analysing “words that are time sensitive, and codes the 
extent to which a theme is being written about in a past, present or future context.” The 
Nesta analysis received a generally favourable commentary in the press and was 
extended with an analysis of the 2017 election Manifestos over several policy areas.  A 
“political futures tracker” by Nesta (2015b), offered an analysis of data streams from 
Twitter, near real time. It aimed to “identify phrases that may have a temporal orientation 
and semantic analysis to guess what that orientation is” (p.12 of the tracker). The 
increasing penetration of social media may help identify several new areas of analysis 
and opinion mining tools. 
Eagleton (2015), a literary theorist, commenting on the writing style of the 2015 
Manifestos, reported that they are generally lacklustre and as follows: the one by the 
Conservatives was the slickest and the most typographically sophisticated; that from 
Labour was a styleless, drably written self-advertisement; the one from the Liberal 
Democrats seriously overweight, stuffed with detailed policies, full of provocative, 
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outrageously radical stuff; that of SNP cast in colourless, low-key, aridly factual prose, 
with little sense of how to buttonhole an audience; the prize for stylishness was given to 
the Green Party.  
The Labour Party Manifesto for the 1983 election has been described as “the longest 
suicide note in history”. This expression was originally used by Gerald Kaufman, Labour 
MP and Shadow Cabinet Minister, to describe his party's Manifesto, “which emphasised 
socialist policies in a more profound manner than previous such documents - and which 
Kaufman felt would ensure that the Labour Party (then in opposition) would fail to win the 
election”. The same reference is found in the New Historian (2017) and in Quinn (2017).  
Does the statement by David Cameron, reported in Hope & Swinford (2017), ... “if you 
get to a position of having to make a pledge you have to stick with it”, imply that 
Manifestos do not need to contain pledges?  This statement is an important component 
in deciding what expectations to have of commitment to the content of a Manifesto. 
But, given the effort that political parties invest to produce Manifestos, do citizens read 
them?  Dӓubler (2014) contends that few people read them and that readership is either 
with strong partisan supporters, or with highly interested individuals who may access the 
writings of several parties for comparison purposes. The question of “why are these the 
policies [that] we need now” is seldom addressed (Innes, 2017), neither is the question 
of whether or not Manifestos are still making an important contribution to the overall 
marketing mix and communications strategy of a political party.  
In a way, the views of Edmund Burke are pertinent about the difference between those 
elected being spokespersons or representatives of the electorate: “your representative 
owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, 
if he sacrifices it to your opinion”. In certain circumstances the need for flexibility in a 
representative democracy could outweigh the likelihood of a binding contractual 
arrangement between the party publishing a Manifesto and other interested parties… 
”Voters don’t decide issues; they decide who will decide issues” (George Will, 
quotations).  
 
2.6 Political Parties and elections in the United Kingdom 
In the UK, the Electoral Commission is charged with the registration and conduct of 
political parties. At the close of 2018, and depending on definitions, it was estimated that 
there were over 400 registered political parties in the UK. Not all parties entering an 
election publish a full Manifesto and, under the “first past the post” system, few gain 
sufficient votes to claim a seat in the House of Commons. For illustrative purposes, as 
shown in Exhibit 1, after the general election of 2001 (the last general election in the 
sample for this project) only about 2% of the registered parties (plus the Speaker) 
managed to get represented in Parliament. 
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Exhibit 1 shows that for the 2001 election turnout was 26.4 million valid votes, or 59.4% 
of the electorate. The Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democratic parties, together, 
earned 90.7% of the vote and claimed 95.6 % of the seats. There has been consistent 
pressure, particularly by the Liberal Democrats and, occasionally, by other smaller and 
regional parties, for the “first-past-the-post” system to be replaced with an alternative 
which would come closer to recognising a proportional representation of the overall 
votes cast. For illustrative purposes, had seat allocation been on a strictly proportional 
basis, the Liberal Democrats could have claimed more than twice the number of seats 
after the 2001 election, thus giving them a more noticeable voice in the House of 
Commons. Would awareness of different voting systems influence the electorate to vote 
differently? It is to be noted that in the aggregate of the 27 general elections during the 
period 1900-2001, the three largest parties (by votes received) earned a mean of 93.6% 
 
Exhibit 1: Results of the general election of 2001. 
Party  2001  
% 
Votes 
2001 
% 
Seats 
Conservative and Unionist 31.7 25.2 
Labour 40.7 62.5 
Liberal Democrats 18.3 7.9 
Democratic Unionist 0.6 0.8 
Scottish National 1.8 0.8 
Sinn Fein 0.7 0.6 
Plaid Cymru 0.7 0.6 
Social Democratic and Labour 0.6 0.5 
Green Party of England and Wales 0.6 0.0 
UK Independence 1.5 0.0 
Turnout, millions 26.4  
Source:  multiple sources accessed from 2001 to 2019. 
of the national vote and claimed 93.9% of the seats in Parliament (Appendix 1). In the 
aggregate, there was a strong correlation (r=.83; p<.001) between votes received and 
seats declared (source: the field studies). So, in the aggregate and over the whole of the 
20th century, the “first-past-the-post” system resulted in a close statistical association 
between votes obtained and seats declared by the three larger parties. The outcomes 
for individual elections and for smaller parties might not be considered as even-handed. 
Given that seats and votes are in whole numbers, a perfect and pedantic proportionality 
is unlikely to be achievable, whatever the system (see Craig, 1975). Depending on 
culture and the discourse of the day, there are likely to be other, more creative, ways of 
achieving closer adherence to proportionality, for example through allocating a weight to 
the electoral votes cast, or incorporating a weighting factor in Parliamentary votes, 
without affecting the number of Members of Parliament. Changing existing practice is 
likely to require a substantial shift by the parties before it gets properly debated and 
considered for adoption. An assessment of the performance of the first-past-the-post 
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system in the 2017 general election (Renwick, 2017) was tested against a number of 
other voting systems and did not conclude with an outright condemnation of this system. 
 
2.7 Evolution of Manifestos: Quo Vadis? and the wider picture 
Nearly two centuries separate the Tamworth Manifesto of 1834 and the time of writing 
the present notes (2018-2019). This period has witnessed major changes in the ways of 
communication between those uttering a message and the intended audience. Whereas 
in Sir Robert Peel’s days the electoral franchise was determined mostly on the basis of 
wealth and dynasty, the 20th century has seen the development of a quasi-universal 
suffrage. This meant that a much larger and more diverse electorate could be reached, 
thus testing new strategies and taking advantage of new media (such as the social 
media) to carry the political message. This evolution has both required the consideration 
of new ways and the exploration of fresh possibilities in the length, content, media used, 
target audience, style, platform and other measurable aspects or dimensions of 
Manifestos.  From Sir Robert Peel’s leaflets and loudhailers, evolving technologies have 
presented opportunities for diversification in message presentation and transmission. 
Imagination, recipient interest and cost, however, are likely to remain constraining 
variables in comparisons between parties. From about 1980 Manifestos have been 
treated more obviously as a part of the overall marketing mix of a party and one of the 
means used for selling its aspirations to the electorate. Manifestos contribute to 
projecting the “brand” of a party and are likely, in time, to benefit from theoretical and 
evidence-based inputs from political marketing or marketing in politics (e.g. Lilleker & 
Pack, Eds, 2016). More and more “advertising discourse” (Haig, 2002, p.213) is being 
borrowed from consumer marketing and greater use is made of lessons learnt at the 
consumer level for how to use the senses to influence decision making. Although party 
Manifestos are reported to have low readership, Alastair Campbell (2013), spokesman 
and campaign director for Tony Blair and later director of communications and 
spokesman for the Labour party, claimed that they still matter. From the end of the 20th 
century, Internet versions of the Manifesto have incorporated sound, animation, drop-
down menus and hyperlinks to other websites. The appearance of supplementary 
Manifestos, devolving regionally (Clark & Bennie, 2016), focusing on specific issues, or 
marketing directed to a narrower audience (Haig, 2002, p.216) (niche marketing) are 
typical examples of additional dimensions and of a product/market mix approach which 
is infusing the literature: Lilleker D & Negrine R (2006); Lees-Marchment J (2008); 
Cwalina W, Falkowski A & Newman B I, (2011); Clark A & Bennie L (2016); Lilleker D & 
Pack M (2016).  
There is little doubt that the role of Manifestos is evolving and needs to be re-examined 
in terms of its position in the marketing mix and the contribution it makes to the overall 
strategy and messaging approach of political parties. The influence of devolution, of 
market segmentation, of the resource allocation process in terms of cost/benefit, the 
availability of funding, friendly as well as disruptive (or sinister) foreign interference, 
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legislation, conventions and the choice of media to convey the message are probably as 
important contributors to the outcome of an election as would be the content of the 
message and the style and clarity of the presentation. A study of how Manifestos have 
changed is thus an important building block to where they stand now and where they are 
likely to go. 
 
3. Manifesto Data Collection and Analysis 
3.1 Period of analysis and data collection protocol  
Data collection in this part of the project has the aim of helping with a general 
understanding and to define what makes up political Manifestos, how they have evolved 
over time and how they differ between the parties. Emphasis will be placed on 
quantitative dimensions, particularly on what is not readily available in the literature, and 
will thus not be confined to variables identified from theory. The period 1900-2001 was 
adopted because it is sufficiently long to allow a trend analysis to be applied. It is also 
sufficiently compact to cope with external changes in the definition and measurement of 
the variables selected and is helpful with cross-sectional analysis. The sample for data 
collection consists of the three front line UK parties, viz. the Conservative and Unionist 
Party, the Labour Party and the Liberal Democratic Party. For the sake of simplicity 
hereinafter these will be shown as: Conservative, Labour and Liberal, even though 
splinter groups and mergers between parties can be observed over the above period. It 
will be assumed that some continuity has existed within these parties during the above 
period but this assumption will be held under observation. These parties have formed 
most of the governments in the period 1900-2001 and have consistently attracted a 
higher proportion of the electorate than the remaining parties. As evidenced in Appendix 
1, aggregated results of general elections for the period 1900-2001, show that these 
parties earned 93.6% of the popular vote and claimed 93.9% of the seats in the House 
of Commons.  
The first operational objective was to gain access to the Manifestos published by the 
parties in the sample from 1900 to 2001, during which period 27 general elections took 
place. It has proven more frustrating than anticipated to procure hard or digital copies of 
the full set of Manifestos through the headquarters of these parties. On the telephone, 
respondents repeatedly claimed not to be holding the full series or to be short of copies. 
One offered to sell part of a set and directed the enquiry towards commercial solutions. 
Respondents from all three headquarters became noticeably less cooperative when the 
enquirer evaded confirming membership of or voting for their respective party. Some of 
the party Manifestos appeared in published form (e.g. Dale, 2013, for the Conservative 
Party), but conversion of hard copy printed text to digital form for analysis would have 
proven onerous. Some university institutions also held partial or complete sets of 
Manifestos in either digital or hard copy form, restricted to their own members and to 
doctoral researchers. 
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Conveniently, all the Manifestos had been posted on the Internet on several sites. Some 
of these sites contained minor errors of classification, requiring repeated cross-
verifications. One Manifesto was picked at random from each party and checked against 
what was shown on other websites (Conservative for 1966, www.conservative-
party.net); (Labour for 1983, www.labour-party.org.uk ); (Liberal for 1950, 
www.libdemManifesto.com ). These proved to be consistent. The 81 Manifestos (3 
parties x 27 elections) were downloaded, saved on a hard drive and copies printed.  
Resulting from casual observation, the investigation starts with analysing the size of 
Manifestos over the period of 1900-2001 and compares the submissions of the three 
parties. The exploratory null hypotheses, which were not derived from theory, were that, 
on a number of defined dimensions, there would be no difference between the 
Manifestos of the parties in the sample, nor in the change over time. 
 
3.2 Proxies for dimensions 
Inspection of the hard copies of the gathered Manifestos showed that there was 
substantial visual divergence in presentational dimensions (font size & style, paragraph, 
indents etc), which varied over time both within and between parties. If, for example, size 
were to be expressed as the “number of pages”, Manifestos for the elections of 2015 
and 2017 measured as shown on the table below (data from GQ Magazine, 2015 and 
2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
The number of pages as a proxy for size is not helpful because there are substantial 
variations in display factors such as page layout, spacing and size of font. Further, 
because presentational dimensions can have some influence on the understanding of 
the content, it was decided that these should be standardized between Manifestos and 
between parties. This was achieved through the capabilities of ordinary word-processing 
software (Microsoft Windows, Word), thus allowing consistency in visual appearance 
and measurement and also greater reliability in replication. A visual inspection of the 
hard copies of Manifestos also showed diversity in the amount of text per page and in 
the inclusion of illustrations and other visual aids and hyperlinks. It was decided not to 
embark on an analysis of the effects of such variables because this task would have 
required greater theoretical underpinning.  
Number of pages 2015 2017 
Labour 86 124 
Conservative 84 88 
Liberal Democrats 158 95 
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From a handful of measurements effected manually and after enquiries with Microsoft-
qualified software engineers in the retail trade (Currys PC World, visits on 2 ; 9 & 30 Oct 
2018) , it was concluded that, in layman’s terms, in Microsoft Word, a “word” is defined 
as any non-empty continuous area appearing between two deliberately entered blank 
spaces (space button or return button). This was verified manually on a sample of three 
documents of 107 words, 161 words and 283 words. The abovementioned engineers 
were convincing that the reliability of software-based estimation would hold when scaling 
up to much larger documents. This contention will be held as an assumption because it 
would not be practical to verify manually the size in words of documents of the 
magnitude encountered in the field studies.   
The number of words per Manifesto (as estimated by the software used) appeared to be 
an acceptable and consistent proxy for size, with the important practical advantage that 
it did not involve manual or operator-dependent measurement.  
 
3.3 Data transformation and analysis 
It was estimated that the 81 Manifestos (3 parties x 27 elections) were made up of over 
1400 pages of A4, possibly containing in excess of 500,000 words. It would have been 
too slow and prone to error to count manually numbers of this magnitude. Conveniently, 
the word-counting facility on Microsoft Word, allowed a consistent approach to 
measurement, which was easy to replicate (count and re-count reliability) on different 
machines and versions of the software used in this project (e.g. Word 2003, 2007 & 
2016). Prior to counting, each Manifesto was inspected visually and several words and 
graphics preceding and following the text were removed because they did not relate to 
the Manifesto word content; it was obvious that these were labelling additions by the 
Web Editors/Masters for ease of classification and retrieval. The number of words in six 
Manifestos of modest size (counting in larger documents would have been more prone 
to errors, thus defeating the benefit of count-recount reliability), relating to the elections 
of 1900 and 1906, were also checked manually and compared with the measurements 
shown by the word-counting facility on Word 2007; these yielded identical results. 
Interestingly, a paper by Haig (2002) showed a word-count for the same sample, 
covering the period 1945 to 2001. A comparison of Haig’s data with those for the present 
project showed only minor variations and there was a very high correlation between 
them (r=0.98; p<.01; two tail). No changes were applied to the content of Manifestos. 
The measurements collected under this protocol are displayed in Appendix 2. Statistical 
work was carried out on Microsoft Excel 2003, 2007 and 2016.  Appendix 3 displays the 
descriptive statistics and Appendix 4 displays the cross-correlations between variables. 
Given that no established theory was used to hypothesise on a direction for differences 
in the values between the variables, it was decided, whenever possible, to apply a two-
tail statistical confidence test. The level of statistical significance was estimated through 
an algorithm drawn from the Internet (e.g.  http://vassarstats.net/rsig.html) and counter-
checked with an algorithm from a different source (e.g. 
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http://www.danielsoper.com/statcalc3/calc.aspx?id=44) (both last accessed 15 Jan 
2019). After an initial assessment of the statistical interpretations, the variance between 
and within the Manifestos of the sample parties was tested with a view to establishing if 
observed differences could be due to chance (Exhibit 15). 
 
3.4 Changes in the size of Manifestos over the period 1900-2001 
The graph in Exhibit 2 displays the number of words in the Manifestos of the sample and 
their total. It is noted that over the period 1900-2001, word content per Manifesto has 
increased close to twenty-fold. The x-axis shows the sequence in which elections took 
place: the first being in 1900 and the last one in 2001. 
Exhibit 2  
 
Source: the field studies (Appendix 2). Microsoft Excel 2016 
It will be noted from Exhibit 3 that Manifestos of the Liberal party showed the highest 
word-count on 5 occasions out of 27, those of the Labour party on 7 occasions and the 
Conservative on 15 occasions. Reciprocally, the Liberal party tabled the lowest word-
count in their Manifestos on 13 occasions (close to 50% of the observations), the Labour 
party on 10 occasions and the Conservatives on only four occasions. Thus, the 
Conservative party was the most verbose and the Liberal party the least! 
Exhibit 3: Frequency of Highest and Lowest word-counts in the Manifestos 
 Liberal Labour Conservative 
Highest word-count 5 7 15 
Lowest word-count 13 10 4 
Source: the field studies (Appendix 2); frequencies out of 81 (3x27) Manifestos. 
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Exhibit 4 shows that there is a strong statistical relationship between the size (word 
count) of the Manifestos of the three parties, particularly between those of the 
Conservative and the Liberal parties.  
Exhibit 4: Correlation coefficients between word-counts in the Manifestos 
 Liberal Labour Conservative 
Liberal 1   
Labour .74** 1  
Conservative .81** .58* 1 
Source: the field studies (Appendix 2); (n=27; *p<.01; **p<.001; two-tail). Microsoft Excel 2007 & 2016. 
Because of the substantial increase in the size of Manifestos over the period of analysis, 
it was decided to also express the size of each Manifesto as a proportion (percentage) of 
the sum of the words in the Manifestos of the three parties for each election (Exhibit 5). 
This simple relative ranking approach directs observations and emphasis on volumetric 
dimensions and circumvents or tones down possible misinterpretations due to the effects 
of auto-correlation (Durbin-Watson statistic, e.g. in Newbold et al, p. 512). 
Exhibit 5: 
 
Source: data from the field studies (Appendix 2) 
Exhibit 5 confirms visually that a relatively high proportion of wording in Manifestos is 
contributed to by the Conservative party and a relatively low proportion of the wording 
was contributed to by the Liberal and Labour parties. Interestingly, Labour won the 
elections of 1964 and 1966 when it submitted the largest Manifestos.  
The relative proportions of words between the parties have been converging (reducing 
trend in standard deviations) as shown in Exhibit 6 for the sampling period, thus showing 
a gradual toning down of the substantial fluctuations observed in the earlier years of 
analysis. No theoretical explanation could be proposed for this trend. 
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Exhibit 6: trend in the variation of the proportion of words used by the 3 parties 
 Source: data from the field studies (Appendix 2) 
 
3.5 An alternative proxy for size 
Exhibit 7:  
 
Source: the field studies (Appendix 2) 
Given the option of expressing size as the volume of information in digital units, it was 
suggested during a visit to the trade (Currys PC World, visits on 2; 9 & 30 Oct 2018) to 
also estimate Manifesto size in kilobytes (KB). This style of unit is increasingly becoming 
of current use in the data management industry. This was also easy to measure with the 
Microsoft word processing software in that it can be made to show on the right-hand side 
of each saved file title and offers the advantage of easy measure-remeasure verification 
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across equipment and versions of the software. The KB for each Manifesto was 
measured and the data shown on Appendix 2 are plotted on Exhibit 7 (above). 
As was the case with word count (Exhibit 4), the correlation coefficients for size 
expressed in KB (Exhibit 8) show a high statistical relationship between the submissions 
of the Conservative and the Liberal parties, and a low relationship between the 
Conservative and Labour parties. 
Exhibit 8: correlation coefficients of KB content in the Manifestos 
 Liberal Labour Conservative 
Liberal 1   
Labour .69** 1  
Conservative .71** .37* 1 
Source: the field studies (Appendix 2); (*ns; **p<.01; two-tail). Microsoft Excel 2007 & 2016.  
How are word count and KB measurements related? The very high and statistically 
significant correlations shown in Exhibit 9 lead to the conclusion that KB and word-count 
measurements, as estimated by the Microsoft software, could be a good proxy for each 
other and thus interchangeable. When Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 7 are superimposed, the 
lines of KB and word-count would show an almost complete overlap.  
Exhibit 9: correlation coefficients between KB and word-count in the Manifestos of the 
sample and their total 
 Liberal 
 word-count 
Labour  
word-count 
Conservative 
word-count 
Total  
word-count 
Liberal KB .98    
Labour KB  .98   
Conservative KB   .93  
Total KB    .98 
Source: the field studies (Appendix 2); (n=27; all significant at p<.01; two-tail), Microsoft Excel 2007 
& 2016. 
As was the case with the growth of the number of words per Manifesto (Exhibit 2 and 
Exhibit 7), the size ratio in KB between the parties is displaying some notable variation 
over the period of analysis. Exhibit 10 displays an increasing variation between the 
parties, (%KBSD), which is confirmed in the fit of the trend-line of standard deviations 
(Exhibit 11). 
 
 
 
 
 
 25 
Exhibit 10:  
 
Source: data from the field studies (Appendix 2).  
Exhibit 11: trend line in the variation of the proportion of KBs used by the 3 parties 
 
Source: data from the field studies (Appendix 2) 
The meaning of the difference in trends between the plots on Exhibit 6 and Exhibit 11 
(%WdSD &%KBSD) could be due to the penetration of information technology, which 
has allowed a more creative or adventurous exploration of what is possible and has 
brought to a level playing field access to technological solutions. It is noticeable that 
during the observation years when divergence in word numbers decreased, the 
complementary measurement of divergence in KB increased; no theoretical explanation 
could be advanced for this observation.  
 26 
During the period of observation (1900-2001), the ratio of words-to-kilobyte has also 
increased manyfold. The meaning and trend of this last observation is not being 
analysed but it suggests that, as technology is developing, parties might be “packing in” 
more words per kilobyte. Is this a measure of efficiency? If so, the Conservative party 
shows a consistently steeper growth (in words per KB) than the other parties. It must be 
remembered that general use of software and of the digital options in Manifestos was 
not widespread before the 1980s.  
 
3.6 Does Size matter? 
Is the party publishing a larger Manifesto likely to achieve a greater level of success in a 
general election? Obviously, what is being tested is a statistical association and not 
causality. Even if the size of a Manifesto were a contributor to the electoral result, the 
content and other influencing variables are expected to have some effect. Over the 27 
elections examined, there were 19 occasions when one of the parties was a clear winner 
and 8 occasions when the results yielded a hung parliament, a coalition or a national 
government. [victory= forming the next government; loss/defeat= not forming the next 
government].  Because of the imprecise definition of this dichotomy, it was decided to 
restrict the initial analysis to the 19 occasions when there was a clear winner. 
The data on Exhibit 12 show that the party with the largest word-count in its Manifesto 
won on only 9 out of these 19 occasions. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected and this 
means that a large word-count in a party’s Manifesto is not statistically associated with 
winning an election.  
The evidence did support the converse hypothesis: the party with the lowest word-count 
in its Manifestos lost on 16 out of the 19 elections. The null hypothesis (that fielding a 
short Manifesto is not statistically linked with losing an election) was rejected (p<.01, 
one-way binomial test, Siegel, 1956, p. 250). Fielding a shorter Manifesto than the other 
parties is therefore linked statistically with not winning an election. Interestingly, on one 
occasion (out of 19), the party with the lowest word-count won that election 
(Conservative, 1983). 
The statistical relationship remains the same when the proxy for size is the number of 
KB per Manifesto. Fielding the largest Manifesto in KB is not associated with winning an 
election. Conversely, fielding the shortest Manifesto in KB is statistically associated with 
not winning an election, the null hypothesis being rejected (p<.01, one-way, binomial 
test, Siegel, 1956, p. 250). 
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Exhibit 12: Election outcomes against size of Manifesto 
Outcome of Election ▼ Word count as the 
Number of Words 
Out of 19 clear 
outcomes 
Word count as 
KB 
Out of 19 clear 
outcomes 
Victory to the party with the 
Highest word count 
9 
47% 
8 
42% 
Victory to the party with the 
Lowest word count 
1 
5% 
2 
9% 
Defeat of the party with the 
Highest word count 
10 
53% 
11 
58% 
Defeat of the party with the 
Lowest word count 
16 
84% 
16 
84% 
Source: extracted manually from the Field Studies (Appendix 2 & Exhibit 16) 
Fielding a shorter Manifesto than the other parties is therefore linked statistically with a 
defeat at that election. But why would a party field a shorter Manifesto than the others? It 
is assumed that parties work on their campaigns independently and do not share their 
communication strategies. Knowing or guessing the size (and content) of one’s 
competitors’ Manifestos is often a case of game theory and the prisoner’s dilemma 
(Poundstone, 1993 and http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PrisonersDilemma.html). A 
party might decide to save resources because it has concluded that it would, in any 
case, lose that election. Although the difference in cost between fielding a large or a 
short Manifesto is not known, it is thought most unlikely that the size-related difference in 
cost will be an important contributing factor to investment decisions in party marketing. If 
the proxy for size were to be the number of KB per Manifesto, the picture would remain 
about the same. If these relationships were to hold in the future as they were observed 
for the past, party strategists would note that investment towards a large Manifesto will 
not necessarily result in success, but it might contribute to reducing the statistical 
likelihood of failure.  
 
3.7 Changes over time in the dimensions of Manifestos 
From the mid 1990s, probably as a result of the development and availability of 
publishing software, printed Manifestos have also embodied an increasing proportion of 
visual aids like tables, charts, sketches and pictures and greater use was made of colour 
in all the media. Furthermore, the rapid development and penetration of portable access 
through the expanding use, range and capabilities of smart mobile communications 
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devices, is changing the meaning, role and importance of the traditional hard copy 
Manifesto as well as that of its distribution through the media. It is likely that not only the 
visual and tangible appearance of a Manifesto will change to take advantage of the 
evolving technology but also the selection of the target audience and the composition of 
the message contained. Different expressions of a message are likely to be directed to 
different target audiences for the same election. Bespoke Manifestos are likely to be the 
new reality. Bespoke to any segment, be it geographic, socioeconomic or categorised in 
any other form of identifiable and definable behavioural response. 
Exhibit 13: correlations between parties on the ratio of words per KB 
 Liberal words/KB Labour words/KB Conservative words/KB 
Liberal words/KB 1   
Labour words/KB .68 1  
Conservative words/KB .64 .71 1 
Source: the field studies (Appendix 2); (n=27; all significant at p< .01; two tail) 
Exhibit 14: correlations between a party’s share of the total number of words in Manifestos 
and its share of total KBs 
 Liberal % words Labour % words Conservative % words 
Liberal % KB .72   
Labour % KB  .70  
Conservative % KB   .78 
Source: the field studies (Appendix 2); (n=27; all significant at p< .01; two-tail) 
The high correlations shown in Exhibit 14 imply a similar approach in the management of 
Manifestos by the three parties. It could be that the higher the correlation coefficient, the 
more advanced the party’s expertise in media management. Under this hypothesis the 
evidence suggests that the Conservative party has shown marginally greater expertise in 
Manifesto management than the other two parties. 
Having examined a number of variables over the 81 Manifestos it would be prudent to 
verify the extent to which variance of measurements within the data from each party 
relates to variance between parties. Under a null hypothesis the means of the 
measurements for each variable would be equal for all three parties. There are several 
statistical tests that can help with a decision in this respect. Under the null hypothesis 
(that there are no differences between the values of the overall data of the three parties) 
the F ratio from an analysis of variance would be expected to be close to 1. The higher 
the value of the F ratio the more likely it is that there are real differences between the 
parties which are not due to chance or to expected fluctuations in the data. The 
calculated F ratio needs further to be checked by applying a post-hoc test to the data. 
Again, there are several options available but the more common and easier to calculate 
is the Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference test (Tukey’s HSD), for which there are 
several free packages online. The Tukey level of significance on Exhibit 15 was 
calculated on an algorithm available through www.mssqltips.com (last accessed 15 Jan 
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2019) and a Q (Studentized) values table from the same site; the levels of statistical 
significance were set at p<.05 and p<.01, as is the convention in the social sciences. 
On the basis of the analysis shown on Exhibit 15, it was concluded that, in the case of 
the size of a Manifesto expressed as word-count or as KB, or as the number of words 
per KB, the null hypothesis stands, i.e. that the differences between the parties, even 
though observed individually on a number of variables and submitted to a number of 
tests, were not statistically significant on the F ratio.    
In terms of the proportion of words (%) occupied by each party for each Manifesto, the 
null hypothesis was rejected in the comparison between Conservative and Liberal 
parties and between Conservative and Labour parties. The null hypothesis held in the 
case of differences between the Labour and Liberal parties. A similar conclusion was 
drawn about the proportion (%) of KBs per Manifesto.  
Thus, on the basis of the variables measured and the tests applied, the Conservative 
party Manifestos stood different from both those of the Liberal and Labour parties. The 
tests also indicated that there was no statistically significant dissimilarity between the 
Labour and the Liberal parties for these variables. 
Exhibit 15: analysis of variance 
Variable F- value 
(ratio) 
P-value 
of F 
Tukey’s HSD 
Lib-Lab 
Tukey’s HSD 
Lib-Con 
Tukey’s HSD 
Lab-Con 
Manifesto 
Size in 
words  
0.92754 .39983 ns ns ns 
Proportion 
(%) of words 
by party 
8.628052 .000412 ns sig. ** sig. ** 
Manifesto 
size in KB 
0.394139 .675396 ns ns ns 
Proportion 
(%) of KB by 
party 
4.302061 .016892 ns ns sig. * 
Words per 
KB 
2.500156 .08363 ns ns ns 
Source: field studies (ns= not significant; * significant at p< .05; ** significant at p< .01). F & P values 
calculated on Microsoft Excel 2007 & 2016; critical value of F= 3.116792.  
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4.Proposals in Manifestos: the case of the House of Lords 
Reform 
The aim of this section is to examine one specific policy area and assess the extent to 
which proposals in Manifestos have been addressed by different parties in government 
and what has been the follow-up. In the absence of a practical or theoretical imperative, 
any policy area could have been chosen for exploratory purposes, e.g. immigration, 
adult education, policing and so on. The House of Lords was chosen out of personal 
interest. The operational purpose of this section is to examine the content of electoral 
Manifestos and to identify text which refers to the Lords or proposes any form of 
constitutional change involving the Lords.  In the process, an attempt is made to quantify 
the dimensions and differences between the three parties in the sample and to identify 
what it is that they are proposing to change. Appendix 9, extracted from “A Briefing 
Paper: House of Lords Reform” prepared by the Political Studies Association under the 
pen of A. Renwick (2011, p.18), shows one view of the positions of the three main 
parties, claiming that these positions have evolved. This claim is understandable, given 
the period of time over which comparisons are made.  
 
4.1 Problems with the Lords: Method and Journey 
For over a century, most political parties have made reference to an ever-increasing list 
of reforms that are considered essential for the House of Lords. But were these reforms 
really needed or were they just intended to detract from other areas of political pressure 
which were more difficult to address?  
When someone criticized Winston Churchill about a wall that he built, he said: "Any fool 
can see what's wrong, but can you see what's right?" (multiple sources, including RBC 
Letter, Jan 1970, Vol. 51, No. 1).  
Notwithstanding the many ills with the Lords advanced over the decades, little evidence 
has been put forward about a functional shortfall considered serious enough to require 
immediate correction. Neither has a proposed correction been assessed as to the 
likelihood of its acceptability (by whom?) nor has serious debate taken place on the 
extent to which the remedy will not be worse than what it was meant to cure. 
“But the House of Lords is a truly unique institution, shaped by a broad range of 
conventions, habits, and expectations. We cannot be certain how these historical 
legacies would interact with the proposed innovations to produce the outcomes that 
interest us” (Renwick, 2011, p.5) 
The leaflets distributed by the three larger parties just before the General Election of 
1983 have heightened interest in this area. Victory went to the Conservatives under 
Margaret (later baroness) Thatcher, followed by a disaster vote for Labour under Michael 
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Foot and for the Liberals under David (later lord) Steel. It was noted that all three parties 
mentioned the Lords in their Manifestos for that election (see Exhibit 16). Labour’s entry 
for 1983 presented some inconsistency in that on the one hand it proposed abolition of 
the Lords, yet later on, in the same Manifesto, it referred to just removing its legislative 
powers. The Liberals undertook to reform both the powers and composition of the Lords, 
whereas the Conservatives undertook to ensure continuity, possibly embarking on some 
symbolic cosmetic tinkering. 
 
4.2 What is Reform?  
References to the Lords in the Manifestos for the period 1900-2001 suggest that 
substantial resources were being committed to talking about change by the three larger 
political parties (Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, Labour). But what do these parties 
mean by reform of the Lords?  The literature lists several possible alternatives, which 
depend on the conceptual context.   
Reform, in the context of the present project, means the action of re-shaping an 
institution with a view to improvement, betterment, amelioration, refinement, as well as 
rectification, correction, amendment, revision. So, reform leads to both the improvement 
of output (productivity of volume or quality on political cost/benefit criteria), as well as the 
ideological adjustment or redirection of what the House of Lords is supposed to do. 
Several sources on the Internet (e.g. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reform, accessed 19 
Nov 2018) claim that the word reform, used in this way, originates from Christopher 
Wyvill’s Association (1700s) which identified “Parliamentary Reform” as its primary aim.  
Apart from one recently defined issue (number of peers), there is no enduring cross-
party consensus as to what is wanting with the Lords, let alone about the change that 
would redress it. The discourse at the time of writing does not include a framework for 
identifying, defining and implementing a change which would be both based in theory 
and also likely to be accepted by the British electorate. It is quite likely that any 
cost/benefit analysis (based on sundry resource allocation theories) will identify areas of 
particular interest to a particular discourse and thus unlikely to generate broad 
acceptability. 
Is change being initiated to satisfy some ideology, independently of definable and 
measurable performance against agreed (by whom?) criteria? The decision to reform the 
Lords, come-what-may, could be quite similar to the judgment of King Louis XVI during 
the French Revolution. In Danton’s words: “Nous ne voulons pas juger le roi, nous 
voulons le tuer (http://lintegral.over-blog.com/article-30699658.html, accessed 19 Nov 
2018). What was important, according to Danton, was to kill the King, as a symbol, and 
not to judge him according to some principle embodied in law. By analogy, should the 
Lords be abolished or transformed, whatever their record, and not be judged or 
evaluated against some defined principle of performance? Is reform of the Lords a 
convenient subject for diversion from other political matters, more difficult to resolve at a 
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particular point in time? Once again, why is reform proposed? by whom? with a view to 
what end? can re-engineering of the Lords, a process, help reach consensus between 
parties, and thus be introduced without challenging ideology? 
It is difficult to resist the transatlantic saying "If it ain't broke, don't fix it" (Lance, 1977), 
which has been used frequently in relation to reform of the Lords. For example, Nick 
Clegg’s proposals in 2011 (at that time Deputy Prime Minister and Leader of the Liberal 
Democratic party), for a reform of the Lords, were labelled as a solution which is looking 
for a problem (Bale, 2011). The debate about reform appears to be based on undefined 
or contrived foundations and it is this particular area which calls for more extensive 
investigation beyond the present work. In the words of Ahl & Allen (1996) “the 
uncertainty of many scientific findings may be the result of asking inadequate questions”; 
by analogy, the uncertainty about reform of the Lords might be rooted in the fuzziness 
and continuously changing definition of what is wrong, why is it wrong, and what polity 
would like to see in its place. Are the parties really after reforming the Lords or are they 
just keen to talk about reform? Why is it that initiatives in this area go far along the 
procedural route but most fail to reach the implementation stage? If the purpose of 
putting forward reform proposals for the Lords is just a means of deflecting attention 
from some other issue, what would happen if, fortuitously (based on catastrophe theory; 
Brown (1995)), a reform were agreed? 
 
4.3 What are the aims of Reform of the Lords? 
Why does the House of Lords matter? The United Kingdom’s unwritten constitution 
assumes a bicameral legislative parliament. Working with two Houses is not essential for 
a democratic system, indeed there are several countries, both old and new, deemed to 
be democratic, with single legislative chambers (e.g Denmark, Finland, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, and scores of others). In any case, on occasion, Labour party 
Manifestos have proposed to abolish the House of Lords (“The Lords must go”: Labour 
Dec. 1910, p.1, line 4 and Labour Jan. 1910, p.1, line 23), but they have not gone as far 
as to propose that it be replaced by a Senate, or merge the two Houses (as was done in 
Sweden from the election of 1970), or just remove the Lords altogether, without anything 
else taking its place.  
Parliament is thought to originate from the council of the Anglo-Saxon kings of England 
as a witenagemot, or ‘assembly of wise men’, to advise the king on all matters on which 
he decided to ask its opinion, although historians are gradually moving away from this 
hypothesis (Longford, 1988). ‘Nobody set out to create Parliament. It developed naturally 
out of the daily political needs of the English King and his government. Nor did it develop 
continuously over time, but went through short periods of rapid growth.’ 
(www.parliament.uk, accessed 11 Apr 2019). As an Anglo-Saxon Council, it became 
involved in matters of new laws, grants of land and disputes between important persons 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica), but it was not a fixed council; the king summoned whom he 
wanted when and where he wanted them. Parliament came into existence out of the 
 33 
witan ‘somewhere in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries’ (Longford, 1988, p.29). It 
was at about that time that the concept of representativeness was introduced with the 
king summoning representatives of the nobles, who were bound to the sovereign by 
feudal ties, of the clergy and bishops and of laymen. There is some uncertainty (Pike, 
1894) as to when a separation took place into two units (the Commons and the Lords) 
but, in recent centuries, both the House of Commons and the House of Lords had to be 
involved in the passing of legislation. “But the House of Lords is a truly unique institution, 
shaped by a broad range of conventions, habits, and expectations.” (Renwick, 2011, 
p.5). The House of Lords has an important contribution to make in the formulation and 
processing of law from its earliest stages to completion, such as proposals (Bills) before 
they become law (Act of Parliament). In this function it has the opportunity to scrutinise 
proposals and to call the government to account and, inter alia, to participate in the law-
making function. It is thus not surprising that political parties, whether in government or 
in opposition, wish to gain or retain control of the management of its law-making 
capabilities and contribution. 
There is no consistent statement in the literature as to what is expected from a Reform 
of the Lords, and by whom. At the superficial level and intuitively, at least some of the 
proposals in the Manifestos are put forward as a way of being critical of another party. 
An interesting consideration of the subject is shown in Renwick (2011, p.33), where 
some criteria for the evaluation of (Government’s) proposals relating to a reform of the 
Lords are put forward. Although these proposals are, in chronological terms, outside the 
period under investigation in this study, they form an interesting decanting of the 
literature and of the discourse in the early part of the 21st century. There is no 
recognisable theoretical underpinning in these proposals other than a wide range of 
views, opinions, political positions and posturing. According to this source, an ideal 
reform of the Lords would take care of the following matters (abbreviated from the 
original): 
• The second chamber should have sufficient legitimacy to perform its role but it 
must not be a rival to the Commons 
• Its representativeness should be enhanced, including not only the regions but 
also women and ethnic minorities 
• The composition of the two chambers should be different 
• No party should hold an overall majority in the second chamber 
• Reforms should encourage independence 
• It should be possible to include individuals with expertise and experience 
• Members should be working towards scrutinising government policies and 
debating major national issues; they should not be developing constituency work 
and a political career. 
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• Reform should not impose an undue extra cost. 
• Voting system should be clear to the electorate 
• There should be integrity in elections or appointments 
• There should be stronger ties between electors and their representatives 
•  It should not be presumed that accountability of members is sought. (present 
writer’s note: this statement appeared inconsistent with the rest and had to be 
verified several times).   
The Electoral Commission holds records (contact 7 Mar 2019) from more than 400 
political parties in the United Kingdom. Some of these are very limited in geographical 
coverage and most of these do not publish text generally accepted as a party Manifesto, 
or, if they do, their formal Manifestos were not readily accessible at the time of this 
project. Reform of the Lords, under various guises, has been on the agenda of several of 
these parties for over a century.   
The next operational aim for this project was to extract from the Manifestos those parts 
of the text that refer to the Lords. The literature was consulted about several methods of 
text, discourse and narrative analysis (e.g. Riessman (1993), Czarniawska (2004), 
Nunan (1993) and Salkie (1995)) and helpful approaches were inspired from each. 
Consideration was given to using expert panels, a questionnaire-based survey, focus 
groups and several other approaches. The two short-listed options were either to 
undertake the task “manually” or to use one of the software packages for textual 
analysis.  
Several data-mining, text analysis or text analytics-style software are discussed on the 
Internet. A few of these are open-source but, at the time of writing, most are proprietary 
and appear to be geared at large scale projects or teams of researchers. The aim of 
these packages is to convert what appears to be an unstructured set of text data, which 
is presented in a natural (everyday) language, into something assumed or designed to 
be more meaningful, something which aims to identify structures and themes. “From 
political theory, to law, to survey research, scholars stand to learn much from the 
application of automated text analysis methods to their domain of interest”, where the 
implicit “promise is that the methods will make possible inferences that were previously 
impossible” (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013). These packages are also likely to deliver a more 
reliable outcome (Dandoy et al, 2015), offer “the potential for a huge increase in the 
scope and power of text analysis within political science” (Laver et al 2003, p.330), and 
the opportunity for fuller use of published resources towards exploring the political 
positions of parties (see, for example, the Comparative Manifesto Project).  
This software-based approach of qualitative analysis appeared attractive and there was 
little doubt that it is a useful tool to help researchers not only explore new avenues of 
analysis but also help make findings more reliable and consistent, independently of 
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operators. At the time of the decision on the present project, there was concern by this 
researcher about the lack of familiarity with these packages, and, more importantly, with 
the enormity of the choice available. Wikipedia, for example (last accessed 5 Feb 2019), 
listed in excess of 50 different alternatives. Further, the (technical) assumptions behind 
each piece of software and the unknown (to this researcher) theoretical and 
epistemological foundations and direction that this enquiry would be led into through 
using these packages, have called for prudence. Progress in data transformation has 
still some way to go before political text can be interpreted using software (Martin & 
Vanberg, 2008). A better working knowledge of the assumptions, models and algorithms 
built into the software would be prudent before their findings become accepted for further 
examination. The practical/operational aspects of using these packages were not 
considered a serious impediment in that they could be mastered with practice (Popping, 
2000; Provost & Fawcett, 2013). Further, to ensure that there is conceptual consistency 
in the findings, prudence in the analysis would have advised investment in alternatives 
for comparison and validation purposes. This approach would have required substantial 
additional resources and was outside the scope of this project. “Automating” the analysis 
and taking advantage of digital technology has to stay on the agenda.  It remains 
essential to compare the outputs of sundry packages in terms of similarities and 
differences in their output, the consistency in their measurements and the theoretical 
bases of their analyses. The literature has been supportive of progress in this area (see 
Martin & Vanberg, 2008).   
The protocol adopted for this project was to read through the hard copies of all 81 
Manifestos (3 parties x 27 elections) and note that part of the text that mentioned the 
House of Lords either directly or by implication. In addition to the words “House of Lords” 
several other expressions were listed: Upper Chamber, Upper House, Lords, revising 
Chamber, Second Chamber, Peers and anything else which, by context, was 
understood by the researcher to mean the House of Lords. The process was repeated 
and some corrections effected. One Manifesto from each party (1923 Liberal; 1970 
Labour and 1992 Conservative) was read for a third time. The findings of this verification 
were consistent with those of the previous readings (test-retest reliability by same 
operator) but it is appreciated that inconsistencies and other human errors remain 
possible (this operation was the most tedious part of this project). 
Each Manifesto entry relating to the Lords was transcribed on a spreadsheet under the 
appropriate party and election date. A comparison of the frequency with which the 
House of Lords is mentioned in individual party Manifestos appears on Exhibit 16. Of 
course, not all words have the same impact, and their meaning also depends on context, 
but this aspect of analysis is outside the scope of the present study. There was also 
some concern about the evolving meaning of words over time and the “basket” or 
“portfolio” of words used at different periods of time (see, for example, Society Now, 
2014). The choice of wording is a function of not only the discourse of the day but also of 
fashion and capability by both the writer of the message as well as the reader. 
Communications theories have much to contribute to the interpretation of Manifestos. 
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Exhibit 16:  Extracts from the Manifestos of the three parties in the sample from 1900-
2001, as these refer to the Lords 
Abbreviations: CON= Conservative; LAB= Labour; LIB= Liberal & Liberal Democrats; HL= House of Lords; COM= House 
of Commons.  
Manifes
to 
LAB LIB CON Gov. 
Elected 
Event & 
Reform 
1900 None So long as the Peers may 
arbitrarily overrule the 
Commons. 
None CON  
1906 None Throughout this period the 
House of Lords, by its docility, 
has done its part to facilitate 
their task. 
None LIB 1906 HL 
rejects bills by 
LIB govt 
passed by 
COM 
1909 budget 
rejected by HL 
creating crisis 
1910  
 Jan 
The great question you are 
to decide is whether the 
Peers or the people are to 
rule this country. …important 
Bills … have been mutilated 
or destroyed by the HL, an 
irresponsible body which 
represents nothing but its 
own class interests… they 
claim the right to decide 
what taxes shall be paid… 
They also claim to dictate 
the date at which Parliament 
shall be dissolved.  The time 
has come to put an end to 
their power to override the 
will of the Commons.  The 
feudal age is past and …the 
people are no longer willing 
to live on the sufferance of 
the Lords. The Lords must 
go. Down with privilege. 
..the House of Lords... rejected 
the whole provision which the 
Commons had made for the 
finance of the year… an 
assumption on the part of the 
non-representative House… 
The House of Lords has 
violated the Constitution...The 
claim of the House of Lords to 
control finance is novel and a 
mere usurpation. Given a Tory 
majority in the House of 
Commons, the House of Lords 
interposes no check upon 
legislative innovations of the 
most violent and unexpected 
kind... it is absurd to speak of 
this system as though it 
secured to us any of the 
advantages of a Second 
Chamber...The limitation of the 
veto is the first and most 
urgent step to be taken... 
Resolution of the Lords that 
country should be consulted 
upon Budget proposals... 
long tirade defending the 
Lords ...possibility of some 
change in composition of 
House of Lords.  Presently 
containing men of first-class 
eminence. 
Hung 
LIB with 
Irish 
Nationali
st 
support. 
 
1910 
 Dec 
Remove Lords as a block in 
the working of our 
Constitution. Strong and 
independent Party of Labour 
sitting in the Lords 
Belated and delusive 
composition which the House 
of Lords is, at the last moment, 
being advised to offer to its 
critics...would result in the 
creation of a Second Chamber 
predominantly Conservative in 
character… practically 
inoperable… capable of 
interposing an even more 
formidable veto than the 
present House of Lords 
Thin disguise of attack on 
the Upper House. Single 
Chamber conspiracy. 
Hung 
LIB with 
Irish 
Nationali
st 
support. 
1911 
Parliament Act 
reduces power 
of HL to reject 
money bills 
from COM. 
1918 None None It has been recognised by all 
parties that reform is 
urgently required in the 
constitution of the House of 
Lords.. ..create a Second 
Chamber which will be 
based upon direct contact 
with the people.. 
CON- 
LIB 
coalition 
1920 Removal 
of Welsh 
Lords Spiritual 
1922 Parliament act must stand, 
and there must be no 
restoration of the Lords’ veto 
None None CON 1922 removal 
of 
representative 
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peers of 
Ireland. 
1923 None None None Hung 
(LAB)  
1924 None None None CON  
1929 None None None Hung 
(LAB)  
1931 Class-conscious hostility of 
the House of Lords…it will 
tolerate no opposition from 
the House of Lords to the 
considered mandate of the 
People… 
None None National 
Govt. 
 
 
1935 … seeks power to abolish 
the House of Lords and 
improve the procedure of the 
House of Commons. 
None None National 
Govt. 
 
 
1945 and in stating it we give 
clear notice that we will not 
tolerate obstruction of the 
people’s will by the House of 
Lords. 
None None LAB 1945 Salisbury 
Convention: 
unwritten 
constitutional 
convention 
that HL may 
not oppose 
what COM has 
passed if 
included in 
Manifesto.  
 
Parliament Act 
1949, limits HL 
delaying 
power to 1 
year for 
money bills 
and 2 
sessions for 
other bills. 
1950 None We are anxious to reform the 
composition of the House of 
Lords, so as to eliminate 
heredity as a qualification for 
membership, which should be 
available to men and women 
of distinction. 
Without mandate and 
without good reason they 
have reduced the powers of 
the House of Lords and 
taken the country a long way 
towards a single chamber.. 
It would be our aim to reach 
a reform and final settlement 
of the constitution and 
powers of the House of 
Lords by means of an all-
Party conference called at 
an appropriate date. It would 
have before it proposals 
that; 
 a) the present right to 
attend and vote based solely 
on heredity should not by 
itself constitute a 
qualification for admission to 
a reformed house.  
b) a reformed House of 
Lords should have powers 
appropriate to its 
constitution, but not 
exceeding those conferred 
by the Act of 1911. 
LAB  
1951 None None None CON  
1955 None None It has long been the 
Conservative wish to reach 
a settlement regarding the 
CON Life Peerages 
Act 1958 
allows either 
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reform of the House of 
Lords, so that it may 
continue to play its proper 
role as a Second Chamber 
under the Constitution.... We 
believe that any changes 
made now should be 
concerned solely with the 
composition of the House. 
 
sex to be 
created life 
peers. 
1959 None None None CON Peerage Act 
1963, women 
inheriting titles 
allowed to sit 
in HL.  
 
Hereditary 
peerages may 
be disclaimed 
for life. 
 
All Scottish 
peers allowed 
to sit in HL. 
1964 we shall not permit effective 
action to be frustrated by the 
hereditary and non-elective 
Conservative majority in the 
House of Lords.  
 
None We have made reforms in 
the composition of the 
House of Lords... 
LAB  
1966 Finally, legislation will be 
introduced to safeguard 
measures approved by the 
House of Commons from 
frustration by delay or defeat 
in the House of Lords. 
None None LAB  
1970 The priorities are clear. We 
have to make existing 
democratic institutions more 
effective and we have to 
extend the democratic 
principle, in various forms, 
into those institutions where 
democracy itself is still a 
stranger. 
We cannot accept the 
situation in which the House 
of Lords can nullify important 
decisions of the House of 
Commons and, with its 
delaying powers, veto 
measures in the last year 
before election. Proposals to 
secure reform will therefore 
be brought forward. 
None None CON  
1974  
 Feb 
None The Westminster Parliament 
would then become a Federal 
Parliament with a reformed 
second chamber in which the 
majority of members would be 
elected on a regional basis. 
None Hung 
(LAB)  
1974   
Oct 
None None None LAB  
1979 No one can defend on any 
democratic grounds the 
House of Lords and the 
power and influence it 
The House of Lords should be 
replaced by a new, 
democratically chosen, second 
chamber which includes 
Now Labour want not merely 
to abolish the House of 
Lords but to put nothing in 
its place. This would be a 
CON  
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exercises in our constitution. 
We propose, therefore, in 
the next Parliament, to 
abolish the delaying power 
and legislative veto of the 
House of Lords. 
representatives of the nations 
and regions of the United 
Kingdom, and UK members of 
the European Parliament. 
most dangerous step. A 
strong Second Chamber is 
necessary not only to revise 
legislation but also to 
guarantee our constitution 
and liberties.  
1983 Take action to abolish the 
undemocratic House of 
Lords as quickly as possible 
and, an interim measure, 
introduce a Bill in the first 
session of parliament to 
remove its legislative 
powers- with the exception 
of those which relate to the 
life of a parliament. 
 
To reform the powers and 
composition of the House of 
Lords, which must include a 
significant elected element 
representative of the nations 
and regions of Britain. 
Labour want to abolish the 
House of Lords. We will 
ensure that it has a secure 
and effective future. A strong 
Second Chamber is a vital 
safeguard for democracy 
and contributes to good 
government. 
CON  
1987 None Only Labour and Conservative 
working peers have been 
appointed to the Lords, in vain 
hope of silencing the Alliance 
voice. 
None CON  
1992 None Reform the House of Lords. 
We will maintain a second 
chamber as a Senate, 
primarily elected by the 
citizens of the nations and 
regions of the United 
Kingdom. It will have power to 
delay all legislation other than 
money bills for up to two 
years. 
None CON Constitutional 
Reform Act 
1995 
1997 End the hereditary principle 
in the House of Lords. A 
modern House of Lords. The 
House of Lords must be 
reformed. As an initial, self-
contained reform, not 
dependent on further reform 
in the future, the right of 
hereditary peers to sit and 
vote in the House of Lords 
will be ended by statute. 
This will be the first stage in 
a process of reform to make 
the House of Lords more 
democratic and 
representative. The 
legislative powers of the 
House of Lords will remain 
unaltered. The system of 
appointment of life peers to 
the House of Lords will be 
reviewed. Our objective will 
be to ensure that over time 
party appointees as life 
peers more accurately 
reflect the proportion of 
votes cast at the previous 
general election. We are 
committed to maintaining an 
independent cross-bench 
presence of life peers. No 
political party should seek a 
majority in the House of 
Lords. A committee of both 
Houses of Parliament will be 
appointed to undertake a 
wide-ranging review of 
Create an effective and 
democratic upper house. We 
will, over two Parliaments, 
transform the House of Lords 
into a predominantly elected 
second chamber capable of 
representing the nations and 
regions of the UK and of 
playing a key role in 
scrutinising European 
Legislation 
We have demonstrated we 
are not against change 
where it is practical and 
beneficial. But fundamental 
changes which have not 
been fully thought through – 
such as opposition 
proposals on the House of 
Lords – would be extremely 
damaging. We will oppose 
change for change’s sake. 
LAB House of 
Lords Act 
1999, 
removed right 
of most 
hereditary 
peers to sit in 
HL and vote. 
 
Creation of 
Supreme 
Court takes 
away judicial 
role of HL. 
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possible further change and 
then to bring forward 
proposals for reform. 
2001 We are committed to 
completing House of Lords 
reform including removal of 
the remaining hereditary 
peers to make it more 
representative and 
democratic, while 
maintaining the House of 
Commons primacy. 
(Wakeham Commission) we 
will seek to implement them 
in the most effective way 
possible. Labour supports 
modernisation of the House 
of Lords procedures to 
improve its effectiveness.  
We will put the Independent 
Appoinments Commission 
on a Statutory footing.  
Replace the House of Lords 
with a smaller directly elected 
Senate with representatives 
from the nations and regions 
of the UK. The Senate will be 
given powers to improve 
legislation. We will transfer the 
judicial functions currently 
undertaken by the House of 
Lords to a new Supreme 
Court. 
The House of Lords, 
historically a source of 
balance and independence, 
has suffered a botched 
reform. 
LAB  
Source: Extracted manually from the Manifestos.  
It will be noted from Exhibit 17 that for the period 1900-2001, there were no statistically 
significant differences between the three parties in the number of times they made 
reference to the Lords in their Manifestos. The Labour party made the longest mentions 
(on average 44.9 words) and also fielded the largest single entry (177 words in 1997). 
Labour also showed the largest variability in the number of words over the period (s.d. 
50.3), confirming wider fluctuations in the size of its mentions when compared with those 
of the other two parties. The Liberal & Labour parties made the largest number of 
mentions (12), the Liberal party used fewer words per mention (av. 38.3) and was the 
most consistent in showing lower fluctuations in the size of its mentions (s.d. 24.5). 
Notwithstanding observable differences between the parties, these were not statistically 
significant (Siegel, 1956).  
 
Exhibit 17: References to the House of Lords in each party’s Manifestos (1900-2001) 
Mentions of Lords in Manifestos Labour Liberal Conservative 
Total number of mentions  12 12 10 
Elections when the only party mentioning the Lords  5 4 2 
Elections when two parties mentioned the Lords * 1 1 1 
Elections when all three parties mentioned the Lords* 6 6 6 
Elections when no party made reference to the Lords* 7 7 7 
Source: the field studies (* in the same election Manifesto) extracted from entries in Exhibit 16.  
It would be of interest to explore further the reasons why out of the 81 opportunities (3 
parties x 27 elections) only 34 (42%) times the Lords were mentioned in the Manifestos. 
It is noted that in 7 out of the 27 elections (ca. 26%) all three parties in the sample made 
no reference to the Lords; it would be interesting to follow this up, presumably more 
pressing matters were of concern to these parties at a higher level at that particular 
period of time.  
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4.4 Nature of proposed reform of the Lords. 
What did the parties say in their Manifestos on how they would reform the Lords if they 
formed the next government? The literature was revisited, including: Czarniawska, 2004; 
DeVellis, 1991; Kirk & Miller, 1986; Mikhaylov et al., 2012; Nunan, 1993; Riessman, 
1993; Salkie 1995, with a view to identifying possible variables (dimensions & scales) 
and an ad hoc Codification was compiled by the present writer and shown on Exhibit 18.  
 
Exhibit 18: A form of Codification of changes to the Lords as proposed in Manifestos 
Reform tabled in Manifestos Proposed 
Code 
Removal of Lords or creation of unicameral parliament  existential 
Change size of membership size 
Change in who has the right to take a seat composition 
Change subject-areas where Lords may impose their will powers 
Change qualifications for admission to the House, age, gender,  qualification 
Change method of joining Lords: inheritance, election, nomination, appointment appointment 
Change and improve procedures efficiency 
General moaning, criticism or sniping, directed at other parties moaning 
Source: present writer’s proposal for analysis of the extracts on Exhibit 16. 
The above codification was influenced by the literature (including Dorey & Kelso, 2011), 
but it is accepted that what might appear to be a minor variation in the definition of each 
heading may lead to a meaningful difference in the outcome of the analysis. Had this 
particular topic been the sole variable in this project, more resources would have been 
invested to sourcing a software option or to reaching a consensus through the use of 
some “expert” panel accompanied by test-retest procedures. Apart from the existential 
label on the “abolition” of the Lords, most of the other changes could fit under a general 
label, such as “reform”; some of the changes could be considered as tidying-up 
operations but others could have more profound constitutional implications. It is thought 
that changes, however minor on first sight, would have some effect over time. It is also 
suspected that, based on several theories in decision-making, the mere fact of proposing 
a change or discussing it is likely to influence behaviour in several areas, much 
depending on the general political climate, circumstances, party positions, other 
discourse(s) and individuals involved. The literature on decision-making within the 
general behavioural sciences is quite extensive, with several seemingly competing and 
often inconsistent approaches; that relating to aspects of political science, as it refers to 
the Lords, will probably need revisiting.  
It will be noted on Exhibit 19 that Labour was the only party to threaten openly abolition 
of the Lords. Both Labour and the Liberals highlighted repeatedly the need to re-visit the 
powers of the Upper House. The Liberals put particular emphasis on the composition of 
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the Lords, both relating to who had the right to sit and how they were to be appointed. 
Consistently with their views about the voting system for the House of Commons, the 
Liberals also emphasised the need for a more representative House of Lords and a 
more direct connection with the electorate. The Conservatives favoured limited or no 
change in most of the dimensions listed. It should be noted that devising reform 
schemes for the Lords might be motivated more by partisan interests than what Dorey & 
Kelso (2011, p.51) call discourses of democratisation, fairness, legitimacy or 
representativeness.  
Exhibit 19:   Frequency of what the parties have proposed in their Manifestos (1900-2001) 
for a House of Lords reform.  
Code/proposal Labour Liberal Conservative Total 
Existential  2   2 
Size  1  1 
Composition 1 5 4 10 
Powers 6 7 2 15 
Qualification    0 
Appointment 1 8 1 10 
Efficiency     
Moaning 1  1 2 
Status quo   5 5 
Unclear 1   1 
Total 12 21 13 46 
Source: Manual application of codification proposed on Exhibit 18 to data shown in Exhibit 16. 
Although differences between the stated intentions of the three parties are noticeable, 
the frequency of these differences is not statistically significant. It is also of interest that, 
during the period included in the analysis, there was limited focus on the size of the 
House of Lords (except for the Bryce Conference in 1918 and of the 2001 Manifesto of 
the Liberals which proposed “a smaller directly elected” chamber). Emphasis on the size 
of the Lords in terms of numbers and, possibly cost, has increased in the years after 
2001 (see, for example, Russell, 2016), although it is quite likely that some of the earlier 
proposals have included, directly or by implication, reviews of these areas in their logic 
or detail. A sample of failed reform proposals is shown in Appendix 6; these were 
compiled from Renwick (2011, pp.16-17). 
An attempt has been made above to measure the frequency and content of statements 
in the Manifestos of how the parties in the sample were proposing to reform the Lords. 
The text of the 81 Manifestos was examined and all references to the Lords were 
transcribed. Although the frequencies of the differences observed were not statistically 
significant, the evidence suggests that the Conservatives were not inclined to introduce 
major reforms. Some tinkering proposed with the composition of the Lords could have 
been more a reaction to what the other parties proposed than a deep-rooted desire to 
change the constitution. The Liberals were consistent in proposing a reform, with 
emphasis on qualitative dimensions such as representativeness and the way in which 
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membership was to be determined. Consistently with their views about elections for the 
House of Commons, the Liberals were also aiming to bring much closer together the 
electorate and membership of the Lords, possibly through direct election. The Labour 
party was more specific in its proposals, aiming for more radical changes to the 
constitution, occasionally going all the way to proposing the abolition of the Lords and 
possibly the introduction of a unicameral Parliament.  
To carry out the above, the researcher used mainly “manual” sorting and analysis 
methods. Given the rapid development and testing of data mining and digital technology, 
it is concluded that careful experimentation with the use of software should be 
considered, particularly with a view to addressing qualitative approaches. 
 
4.5 Have the parties in the sample delivered the reforms of the Lords 
proposed in their Manifestos? 
As displayed on Exhibit 19, proposals for reform of the Lords address a multitude of 
decision areas. The general literature presents a long list of changes which have been 
introduced over the centuries under formal or informal procedures. At the time of writing, 
change can be introduced formally by law and Standing Orders or less formally by 
unwritten custom and practice and by Precedent. Although law-making and Standing 
Orders are defined, e.g. Standing Orders are written rules formulated by each House to 
regulate its own proceedings. They cover, for example, how business is arranged and 
conducted, the behaviour of MPs and members of the House of Lords during debates, 
and rules relating to committees. (www.parliament.uk, accessed 26 Feb 2019), the rest 
is often a matter of interpretation, negotiation, adaptation, convention and influence. A 
comprehensive listing was originally compiled by Erskine May and regularly updated as 
a 'Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament' which is 
considered the authoritative source on parliamentary procedure by providing details of 
observed 'rules' within the House, whether they relate to Standing Orders (and are 
therefore regulated by the House), traditional practice or whether they derive from 
'Speaker's Rulings'. (www.parliament.uk accessed 26 Feb 2019). Reform may also be 
included in ad hoc, uncodified arrangements or “softer” methods of change which are 
seldom documented. It is suspected that they not only allow for innovation and reform to 
be introduced but, more importantly, perform an informal safety valve in unforeseen 
circumstances. Given the long history of the Lords and the multitude of avenues for 
change, what is meant by fulfillment of a Manifesto undertaking relating to reform?  
It was claimed earlier that Manifesto “... statements are so general that it would be 
difficult not to find any evidence of fulfillment” (Barra, 2005). Assessing the reciprocal, 
i.e. non-fulfilment, would be of similar difficulty by aiming to establish which part of a 
Manifesto undertaking is still wanting. A strict adherence to the words used in a 
Manifesto might prove to be too pedantic and either quasi-impossible to deliver or 
deemed to have been delivered with a token change. If, as discussed earlier, a 
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Manifesto forms a part of a marketing communication strategy, then some flexibility in 
wording might be expected as of practical necessity. It could be argued that what is 
declared in a Manifesto should be read and examined together with the content of other 
communications and media used by a party. A party’s undertaking is only partly 
contained in a published Manifesto; the remaining media used form both an essential 
supplement and complement for consumption. It is not proposed to develop further this 
theory at present. For this project, evidence of an undertaking by a party to reforming the 
Lords will be limited to the wording used in its Manifesto. 
After re-visiting the Manifesto entries on the Lords, it was decided to explore the 
usefulness of separating these into two groupings. The first grouping would include 
“passive” statements and criticism of a situation or of the other political parties and 
declare a conceptual positioning. The generality of undertakings under this heading is 
likely to make it difficult to determine the extent to which they have been delivered, but it 
is worth exploring. The second grouping would point to a direction of “action” to be taken 
and thus hopefully towards a more practical verification of fulfillment. Together they form 
what a party proposes or undertakes to reform in the Lords (the stimulus). The delivery 
or implementation (the response) would include legislation or reforms introduced during 
the parliament session for which a Manifesto was published. It is not known to what 
extent there is a carry-over effect of either influence or action from one Manifesto to a 
later parliament, for which it is anticipated that a fresh mandate will be published. Nor is 
there clear evidence of how decisions and proposed actions by any party have 
influenced decisions or actions of subsequent governments or of other parties. The 
possibility of this residual or carry-over effect needs to be investigated. In this project the 
simple trail of action will go from undertaking (stimulus) to delivery (response). 
Undertaking (stimulus)    Delivery (response) 
# Passive statements     # Law, Standing Orders etc 
# Action statements 
For fuller (forensic) verification the direction of action will also be reversed. 
Observed reform     Anteceding undertaking in Manifestos 
Listing of the completed reforms (the response) has been limited to what has been 
published and is shown in Purvis (2011) from the Library of the House of Commons, 
Parry (2012) from the Library of the House of Lords and Renwick (2011) from the 
Political Studies Association. 
A more holistic approach to decision-making in Parliament, taking note of all steps and 
influences in the law-making process, would need to be considered. Such an approach 
would require substantially greater resources than available and yet still retain 
methodological limitations. The simplified approach adopted here aims to verify the link 
between a recorded end-product (= a reform introduced by law) and an undertaking by a 
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party through its Manifesto published immediately preceding an election. The list of 
reforms is shown on Exhibit 16 and Exhibit 20 and further analysed on Appendix 5. 
Exhibit 20: (subjective) Classification of Lords-related references in the Manifestos of the 
parties in the sample 1900-2001. 
Abbreviations: CON= Conservative; LAB= Labour; LIB= Liberal.  
Manifesto LAB LIB CON Gov. Elected Event or Reform 
1900  powers  CON  
1906  powers  LIB  
1910 Jan abolition powers powers, composition Hung LIB with Irish 
Nationalist support. 
 
1910 Dec powers: 
unclear 
composition, 
powers 
 
 
status quo, moaning Hung LIB with Irish 
Nationalist support. 
1911 Parliament Act. Reduces 
power of Lords to reject money 
bills. 
1918  composition appointment CON- LIB coalition 1920 Removal of Welsh Lords 
Spiritual 
1922 status quo   CON 1922 removal of representative 
peers of Ireland. 
1923    Hung (LAB)  
1924    CON  
1929    Hung (LAB)  
1931    National Govt.  
1935    National Govt.  
1945 powers   LAB 1945 Salisbury Convention  
Parliament Act 1949,  
1950  appointment, 
composition. 
composition, powers LAB  
1951    CON  
1955   composition, status 
quo 
CON Life Peerages Act 1958  
1959    CON Peerage Act 1963. Women 
inheriting titles may sit in the 
Lords.  Hereditary peerages 
may be disclaimed for life.  
Scottish peers allowed to sit in 
the Lords. 
1964   composition LAB  
1966 powers   LAB  
1970 powers   CON  
1974 Feb  appointment  Hung (LAB)  
1974 Oct    LAB  
1979 powers composition, 
appointment 
status quo  CON  
1983 Abolition, 
powers 
powers, 
composition, 
appointment 
status quo CON  
1987  appointment  CON  
1992  appointment, 
powers 
 CON Constitutional Reform Act, 
1995 
1997 composition, 
appointment 
Appointment, 
powers 
status quo LAB House of Lords Act 1999, 
removed right of most 
hereditary peers to sit in the 
Lords. 
Creation of Supreme Court 
taking away judicial role of the 
Lords. 
2001 moaning powers, 
composition, 
appointment 
moaning LAB  
Source: (subjective) Application of code from Exhibit 18 to data from Exhibit 16. 
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Starting with the end-product (Constitutional Event or Reform introduced) affecting the 
Lords, is there wording in the preceding Manifesto of the party in government at the time 
of the introduction, which commits itself to such action?   
• The first decade of the 20th century was politically uneasy, to say the least. There 
was an elected Liberal majority in the House of Commons which was finding it 
difficult to implement its governmental programme because it was obstructed by 
the unelected Tory majority in the Lords. The 1911 Parliament Act, had “a 
profound effect on constitutional and political legislation in the 20th century” 
(Ballinger, in Norton (Ed.) 2011, p. 19). Through this Act the primacy of the 
House of Commons in matters of financial legislation was placed on the statute 
book. Inter alia, the Lords’ absolute veto was replaced by a period of suspension 
of about two years. The maximum duration of parliament was reduced from 
seven to five years. Although party Manifestos in 1900 to 1911 reflect the general 
malaise between parties, as well as between the House of Commons and the 
House of Lords, they do not specify the kind of legislative action to be 
undertaken; it could be argued that all three parties pointed a finger at the House 
of Lords, from innocuous tinkering by the Conservatives, to a functional 
adjustment by the Liberals, to the occasional outburst by Labour (“The Lords 
must go”: Labour Dec. 1910, p.1, line 4 and Labour Jan. 1910, p.1, line 23). 
• The Welsh Church Act, 1914 was an Act “to terminate the establishment of the 
Church of England in Wales and Monmouthshire”. This Act was not implemented 
until after the end of the 1st World War. From then on Welsh Bishops could no 
longer sit at the House of Lords as Lords Spiritual, which resulted in a potential 
reduction of the membership of the House of Lords. 
• Removal of the representative peers of Ireland, 1922. A number of Irish peers 
were elected to sit in the House of Lords for life. This practice ceased in 1922 
with the formation of the Irish Free State as an Independent Dominion, thus 
reducing membership of the House of Lords. The last Irish representative peer 
for life passed away in 1961. 
• The relationship between the House of Lords and the House of Commons 
remained contentious, with numerous non-specific references in Manifestos (e.g. 
“it will tolerate no opposition from the House of Lords to the considered mandate 
of the People” (Labour 1931 p.2 line 5 from bottom); “we will not tolerate 
obstruction of the people’s will by the House of Lords” (Labour 1945 p. 3, line 9 
from bottom). The outcome of the 1945 election was a large majority (146) for 
Labour, which had to work with an overwhelmingly Conservative House of Lords 
(McLean, 2011). An agreement was reached between Lord Cranborne (later 
Salisbury) and Lord Addison, the Leader of the House, which was communicated 
to the House of Lords in August 1945. It is known as the Salisbury or Salisbury-
Addison Convention or Doctrine. It entails that the House of Lords should not 
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oppose a Government Bill from the House of Commons if the idea motivating 
such a Bill was included in the Manifesto of the party elected to form the 
government. There is general debate as to the situations when such 
arrangement applies and occasional concern about implementation (Kelso in 
Norton [Ed.] 2011, p.105 and Dorey & Kelso 2011, p. 64 et seq).   
• The 1949 Parliament Act is reported to have been motivated by three factors 
(Dorey & Kelso, 2011, inter alia pp. 84-86), first as a precautionary measure 
against possible hindrance by the House of Lords to legislation to be introduced 
by a predominantly Labour House of Commons b) as a means of calming down 
the Left of the Labour Party in matters of nationalisation and c) as a means of 
avoiding taking more radical steps in reforming the House of Lords. The 
achievement was a reduction of the delaying power of the House of Lords from 
two years down to one; helpful to the Labour Party and to the House of 
Commons but not specifically pledged in a Manifesto.   
• The Manifesto of the Liberal Party for 1950 (p.6 lines 2-4) declared “We are 
anxious to reform the composition of the House of Lords, so as to eliminate 
heredity as a qualification for membership, which should be available to men and 
women of distinction”. But the Liberal Party was not in power at that time and had 
little influence on major issues. The Labour Party on the other hand, saw the 
creation of Life Peers as a means of increasing its representation in the House of 
Lords and thus of its voice in debates. Henceforth Life peerages could also be 
conferred on women. The 1958 Life Peerages Act, introduced by the 
Conservatives, was not based on a pledge in their Manifesto. 
• The 1963 Peerage Act authorised “the disclaimer for life of certain hereditary 
peerages” and provided for the inclusion “among the peers qualified to sit in the 
House of Lords all peers in the peerage of Scotland and peeresses in their own 
right in the peerages of England, Scotland, Great Britain and the United 
Kingdom; to remove certain disqualifications of peers in the peerage of Ireland in 
relation to the House of Commons” ( www.legislation.gov.uk  accessed 30 Mar 
2019). This piece of legislation was introduced by the Conservative Government 
and had not been pledged in their Manifesto; it also removed the limitation to 16 
peers to represent Scotland and thus increased the potential membership of the 
House of Lords. 
• In its 1997 Manifesto (p. 40-41) the Labour Party pledged to create a modern 
House of Lords, “The House of Lords must be reformed. As an initial, self-
contained reform, not dependent on further reform in the future, the right of 
hereditary peers to sit and vote in the House of Lords will be ended by statute.” 
Taking advantage of a large majority (178) in the House of Commons after the 
1997 elections, the Labour Government started implementing this pledge through 
the 1999 House of Lords Act by removing all but 92 hereditary Peers. The 
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remaining undertakings in the Manifesto in relation to the House of Lords appear 
to have stalled.  
• In the same 1997 Manifesto (p. 41 lines 8-9), Labour declared that “The system 
of appointment of life peers to the House of Lords will be reviewed.”  The result 
was the creation in 2000, without primary legislation, of the House of Lords 
Appointments Commission.  
The evidence tabled above shows that there were some occasions when the parties in 
government delivered their Manifesto undertakings relating to reform of the House of 
Lords: e.g.1911 Parliament Act; 1945 Salisbury Convention; 1949 Parliament Act; 1958 
Life Peerages Act; and partly the 1999 House of Lords Act, followed by the 2005 
Constitutional Reform Act (just beyond the period of analysis). The few remaining reform 
undertakings were either not delivered or their fulfillment has not been recorded in the 
sources shown above.  
Forensically, the evidence also shows that a number of reforms were introduced without 
their prior specific reference or undertaking in Manifestos: e.g. the 1920 removal of 
Welsh Lords Spiritual, the 1922 removal of Representative Peers of Ireland and the1963 
Peerage Act.  But this does not mean that these reforms were not a party policy 
declared in an earlier Manifesto or on a platform other than a Manifesto, such as a 
consequence of a major constitutional crisis. The possibility of a carry-over effect needs 
to be investigated. 
In looking for contextual conditions during the debates on the legislation listed above, 
one characteristic appears obvious. Most of these legislative measures were introduced 
when the Government held a safe majority in the House of Commons. The Conservative 
Government had the benefit of a majority of 283 when it implemented the Welsh Church 
Act, 1914 in 1920. The majority was of 74 when the Removal of the representative peers 
of Ireland, 1922 was implemented. Labour had a majority of 147 when the Salisbury or 
Salisbury-Addison Convention or Doctrine was adopted in 1945 and also when the 1949 
Parliament Act reached the Statute Book. Similarly, the Conservative Government held a 
majority of 59 at the time of the 1958 Life Peerages Act, and of 95 at the time of the 
1963 Peerage Act. Unsurprisingly, Labour held a majority of 178 when the 1999 House 
of Lords Act was passed and a majority of 166 when House of Lords Appointments 
Commission was created in 2000. It is worth noting that no change to the House of 
Lords was introduced when a party in government held a majority of fewer than 59. 
(Data from: House of Commons, UK Election Statistics, 2018). The only exception to this 
observation is the 1911 Parliament Act.    
A few failed proposals to reform the House of Lords are listed in Appendix 6 (from 
Renwick, 2011); these cannot be linked to times when the government of the day 
commanded only a small minority in the House of Commons. Therefore, although a high 
majority in the Commons is statistically associated with successful introduction of reform 
measures for the House of Lords, failed proposals are not necessarily related to low 
majorities (for example, the Parliament (No.2) Bill, which proposed the splitting of the 
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House of Lords into voting and non-voting members, was abandoned in 1968, even 
though the government held a majority of 97). The hypothesis, based on received 
wisdom, linking the likelihood of successful introduction of reforms to the House of Lords 
with government majorities in the House of Commons would need to be better defined 
operationally prior to further testing. 
 
5. Contribution, Limitations and Summaries  
This study has addressed a number of areas where the literature on Manifestos was 
incomplete or unclear and has made a modest contribution towards filling some gaps. A 
special case relating to Reform of the House of Lords is aiming to examine the extent to 
which pledges in Manifestos have been delivered when a party won an election and 
formed a government. 
Manifestos are statements of intention of what a political party claims it will deliver if it 
were to form the government after elections. There is an expectation that pledges will be 
delivered and frequent exhortations for these to be legally binding. The commitment is, 
at best, political, and there is neither evidence of a contractual relationship, in the sense 
that it has not been tested in a court of law in the UK, nor a prediction that it is likely to 
become so. The Salisbury convention ensures that greater weight is given by Parliament 
to proposals that have been based on a party’s Manifesto and that they will not be 
opposed when they reach the Lords. This convention has not been tested on minority 
governments, national governments or coalitions but analysis of the literature leads to 
the conclusion that it is unlikely to apply in these situations.  
A longitudinal study of a sample of three British political parties over the 20th century was 
undertaken through the examination of their Manifestos for 27 elections from 1900 to 
2001. Although the sample consisted of only three out of the 400-or-so of the parties 
registered by the Electoral Commission, it represented in excess of 90% of the votes 
cast during the sampling period.  
Some initial difficulties were encountered in the collection of the full set of Manifestos for 
that period, but adequate copies could be sourced through the Internet. Variables in 
Manifestos, particularly size, were selected on the basis of convenience and expediency. 
The number of words and the number of Megabytes have been defined and tested as 
acceptable proxies for the size of a Manifesto. The high level of correlation between 
these two variables proposes their suitability as proxies for each other. Functions 
already installed as part of the Microsoft word-processing software proved a reliable 
instrument (test-retest) for the measurement of size (Microsoft Word 2003, 2007, 2016).  
It was noted that limiting the analyses to quantitatively expressed variables may have 
missed other expressions (e.g. qualitative), which might have a meaningful contribution 
on the overall view of the evolution of Manifestos. The application of data-analytic 
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software needs to be considered with a view to exploring qualitative dimensions in 
Manifestos. 
It was observed that political parties have been publishing increasingly larger Manifestos 
during the 20th century, from fewer than 200 words in 1900 to over 30,000 words in the 
late 1990s. Although the Tamworth Manifesto, which is assumed to be the first published 
political party Manifesto in the UK, was the equivalent of only a handful of pages long, 
Manifestos have evolved during the 20th century to become substantial publications with 
illustrations, extensive extensions and digital versions with hyperlinks based on the 
application of modern technology. The rapid penetration of new platforms, such as the 
social media and smart mobiles, mean that hard copy Manifestos may no longer be 
viewed as the main medium for the declaration of a party’s position on a particular issue. 
Manifestos are now a part of a wider approach to a party’s marketing mix and 
communications approach and their role in the overall party strategy needs to be 
reassessed.  
On examining the extent to which there were similarities or differences between the 
Manifestos of the parties in the sample, it was observed that those of the Conservative 
party stood out as generally the wordiest and those of the Liberals the shortest and 
better written. A substantial increase in size of Manifesto is noticeable for all parties, 
particularly since the election of 1979; presumably this is contributed to by the 
penetration of new technology in the preparation of Manifestos.  
The evidence shows that fielding a large Manifesto is not linked statistically with 
achieving success in a particular election, but there is a statistical association between 
fielding the shortest Manifesto and losing in that election. Although statistically significant 
differences were observed between the Manifestos of the three parties on some of the 
variables measured, an analysis of variance on the aggregate data could not reject the 
hypothesis that the observed differences were probably due to chance.  
The policy area proposing a Reform of the House of Lords was chosen as a specific 
case to examine the link between declarations in Manifestos and delivery by the party in 
government. There was no evidence of consistency within or between the parties, nor 
over time, as to what is wrong with the Lords and against what criterion, and what needs 
to be done to correct it. Concerns about the very existence of the Lords and of the 
protocols for both accession and behaviour of its members have been a periodic malaise 
on the political scene. The Conservatives have generally aimed to maintain the status 
quo, with minor concessions in the form of tinkering in areas leading to appeasing the 
current problem. The Liberals have aimed for a broader representation of the electorate 
and the use of alternative approaches to selection of individuals and to the composition 
of the House of Lords. The Labour Party has aimed for a more radical reform, at times 
pledging existential solutions, such as the abolition of the Lords. This lack of consistency 
of aims, both between the parties and within a party over time, and the absence of 
consensus among parties as to what is wrong with the Lords, have probably contributed 
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to most of the reforms actually undertaken being piecemeal and not in keeping with the 
vocabulary and magnitude of what had been proposed.   
The next step was the examination of the extent to which there is a direct relationship 
between reforms of the Lords proposed by a party in its Manifesto and measures 
actually introduced when that party formed the next government. The evidence showed 
that some reforms were introduced without pre-announcement of intention in a party’s 
Manifesto. The reciprocal was also observed in the sense that there were several 
Manifesto declarations which did not get followed-up with action when the author-party 
was in government. The conclusion reached is that declaration of intent in a Manifesto is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for action to be undertaken by a party 
when in government, at least in relation to this policy area.  
The assumption of a simple direct link between a pledge in a Manifesto and action being 
delivered when in government is probably too simplistic and presents an important 
limitation to the conclusions of this part of the investigation. The decision process needs 
to be unfolded to take into account other influences on government, for example impact 
of previous policy positions, including older Manifestos, be they of that party or those of 
other parties, of other influencing bodies which might not necessarily be tied to a political 
party, the general political economy and, possibly to an increasing extent, of 
international perspectives and issues.  
Further, a government may take action which might prove rather long to process into law 
due to complexity or other contingencies. Although the simplistic binary statement may 
not capture government action as an achievement, progress to date might have gone a 
long way towards preparing the ground for action on a separate occasion. 
The grounded theory approach adopted in this project has helped follow up several trails 
in a general investigation about the evolution of Manifestos. The evidence examined has 
highlighted some of the changes that have taken place in Manifestos over time, 
particularly to the need for a redefinition of their role in the overall communications mix of 
parties. Evolving technology and penetration of applications through the social media 
contribute to giving access to a wider range of theories and practice from marketing 
strategy and consumer behaviour. Study of Manifestos and of any special case (such as 
Reform of the Lords) in future should benefit from being informed by the conduct, 
findings and limitations of the present study.  
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Appendix 1: Votes gained against Seats declared in 27 
elections,1900-2001. 
 
Source: the field studies. Calculation on Microsoft Works Excel 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 59 
Appendix 2: Matrix of Basic Data 
 
 60 
Appendix 3: Descriptive Statistics of Basic Data 
 
Source: The Field Studies, Calculated on Microsoft Works Excel 2007, data from Appendix 2 
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Appendix 4: Correlations Matrix of Basic Data  
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Appendix 5: What parties in Government had stated in their 
Manifestos and Reforms introduced during term of parliament  
Abbreviations: CON= Conservative; LAB= Labour; LIB= Liberal & Liberal Democrats; HL= House of Lords; COM= 
House of Commons.  
Manifesto 
for 
Election 
of 
Party 
forming 
Government 
Extracts of 
Positioning and 
Criticisms in 
Manifesto of party 
forming 
Government 
Action statement in 
Manifesto of party 
forming Government 
Constitutional Event 
or Reform introduced 
during term of 
parliament. 
 
1906 LIB Throughout this 
period the House 
of Lords, by its 
docility, has done 
its part to facilitate 
their task. 
 1906 HL rejects bills by 
LIB govt passed by 
COM 
1909 budget rejected by 
HL, creating crisis 
 
1910 Jan Hung LIB 
with Irish 
Nationalist 
support 
    
1910 Dec Hung LIB 
with Irish 
Nationalist 
support 
Belated and 
delusive 
composition 
which the House 
of Lords is, at the 
last 
moment…would 
result in the 
creation of a 
Second Chamber 
predominantly 
Conservative in 
character… 
practically 
inoperable… 
capable of 
interposing an 
even more 
formidable veto 
than the present 
House of Lords. 
 1911 Parliament Act, 
reduces power of HL to 
reject money bills from 
COM 
 
1918 CON & LIB 
coalition 
NONE 
It has been 
recognised by all 
parties that reform 
is urgently 
required in the 
constitution of the 
House of Lords. 
... create a Second 
Chamber which will be 
based upon direct 
contact with the 
people… 
1918 Bryce Conference; 
proposals fizzled out. 
 
1920 Removal of Welsh 
Lords Spiritual. 
 
1922 CON   1922 Anglo-Irish Treaty; 
Removal of 
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Representative Peers of 
Ireland. 
1945 LAB And in stating it 
we give clear 
notice that we will 
not tolerate 
obstruction of the 
people’s will by 
the House of 
Lords. 
 1945 Salisbury 
Convention: unwritten 
constitutional 
convention that HL may 
not oppose what COM 
has passed if included 
in Manifesto.  
Cross-Party talks, 1948. 
Proposals fizzled out. 
 
Parliament Act 1949 
limits HL delaying power 
to 1 year for money bills 
and 2 sessions for other 
bills. 
 
1955 CON It has long been 
the Conservative 
wish to reach a 
settlement 
regarding the 
reform of the 
House of Lords, 
so that it may 
continue to play 
its proper role as 
a Second 
Chamber under 
the Constitution... 
We believe that any 
changes made now 
should be concerned 
solely with the 
composition of the 
House. 
Life Peerages Act 1958, 
allows either sex to be 
created life peers. 
 
1959 CON   Peerage Act 1963, 
women inheriting titles 
allowed to sit in HL.  
 
Hereditary peerages 
may be disclaimed for 
life. 
 
All Scottish peers 
allowed to sit in HL. 
 
1966 LAB  Finally legislation will 
be introduced to 
safeguard measures 
approved by the House 
of Commons from 
frustration by delay or 
defeat in the House of 
Lords. 
Parliament (No.2) Bill 
1968 dropped in 1969. 
 
1997 LAB They support 
hereditary peers… 
End the hereditary 
principle in the House 
of Lords. A modern 
House of Lords. The 
House of Lords must be 
reformed. As an initial, 
self-contained reform, 
not dependent on 
further reform in the 
future, the right of 
House of Lords Act 
1999, removed right of 
most hereditary peers to 
sit and vote in HL. 
 
Constitutional Reform 
Act, 2005. Ensure 
independence of 
judiciary. Creation of 
Supreme Court takes 
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hereditary peers to sit 
and vote in the House 
of Lords will be ended 
by statute. This will be 
the first stage in a 
process of reform to 
make the House of 
Lords more democratic 
and representative. The 
legislative powers of 
the House of Lords will 
remain unaltered. The 
system of appointment 
of life peers to the 
House of Lords will be 
reviewed. Our objective 
will be to ensure that 
over time party 
appointees as life peers 
more accurately reflect 
the proportion of votes 
cast at the previous 
general election. We are 
committed to 
maintaining an 
independent cross-
bench presence of life 
peers. No political party 
should seek a majority 
in the House of Lords. A 
committee of both 
Houses of Parliament 
will be appointed to 
undertake a wide-
ranging review of 
possible further change 
and then to bring 
forward proposals for 
reform. 
away judicial role of HL. 
1999-
2000 
LAB   Royal Commission on 
the House of Lords 
1999-2000. 
 
Broad acceptance by 
Labour party, no follow-
up legislation. 
 
2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LAB  We are committed to 
completeing House of 
Lords reform including 
removal of the 
remaining hereditary 
peers to make it more 
representative and 
democratic, while 
maintaining the House 
of Commons traditional 
primacy.  
(Wakeham 
Commission) we will 
seek to implement them 
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 in the most effective 
way possible. 
Labour supports 
modernisation of the 
House of Lords 
procedures to improve 
its effectiveness. 
We will put the 
Independent 
Appointments 
Commission on a 
statutory footing. 
 
Sources: extracted manually from: Purvis (2011), Parry (2012), Renwick (2011) and from the sample hard copies 
of party Manifestos (1900-2001). 
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Appendix 6: Failed reform proposals 
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Source: copied from Renwick A.: House of Lords Reform, a Briefing Paper, Political Studies 
Association, June 2011. www.psa.ac.uk  
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Appendix 7: Evolving positions of the parties on Reform of the Lords 
 
Source: copied from: Renwick A.: House of Lords Reform, a Briefing Paper, Political Studies 
Association, June 2011. www.psa.ac.uk ; See also: Evans G & Norris P (Eds) (1999): Critical 
Elections, British Parties and Voters in Long Term Perspective, Sage, London 0761960201 
 
 69 
Appendix 8: Text of the “Tamworth Manifesto”  
This version: 2394 words 
To the Electors of the Borough of Tamworth. 
Gentlemen, 
On the 26th of November last, being then at Rome, I received from His Majesty a summons, wholly unforeseen and 
unexpected by me, to return to England without delay, for the purpose of assisting His Majesty in the formation of a new 
government. I instantly obeyed the command for my return; and on my arrival, I did not hesitate, after an anxious review of 
the position of public affairs, to place at the disposal of my Sovereign any services which I might be thought capable of 
rendering. 
My acceptance of the first office in the Government terminates, for the present, my political connection with you. In 
seeking the renewal of it, whenever you shall be called upon to perform the duty of electing a representative in 
Parliament, I feel it incumbent on me to enter into a declaration of my views of public policy, as full and unreserved as I 
can make it, consistently with my duty as a Minister of the Crown. 
You are entitled to this, from the nature of the trust which I again solicit, from the long habits of friendly intercourse in 
which we have lived, and from your tried adherence to me in times of difficulty, when the demonstration of unabated 
confidence was of peculiar value. I gladly avail myself also of this, a legitimate opportunity, of making a more public 
appeal - of addressing myself, through you, to that great and intelligent class of society of which you are a portion, and a 
fair and unexceptionable representative - to that class which is much less interested in the contentions of party, than in the 
maintenance of order and the cause of good government, that frank exposition of general principles and views which 
appears to be anxiously expected, and which it ought not to be the inclination, and cannot be the interest of a Minister of 
this country to withhold. 
Gentlemen, the arduous duties in which I am engaged have been imposed on me through no act of mine. Whether they 
were an object of ambition coveted by me - whether I regard the power and distinction they confer as of any sufficient 
compensation for the heavy sacrifices they involve - are matters of mere personal concern, on which I will not waste a 
word. The King, in a crisis of great difficulty, required my services. The question I had to decide was this - Shall I obey the 
call? Or shall I shrink from the responsibility, alleging as the reason, that I consider myself, in consequence of the Reform 
Bill, as labouring under a sort of moral disqualification, which must preclude me, and all who think with me, both now and 
for ever, from entering into the official service of the Crown? Would it, I ask, be becoming in any public man to act upon 
such a principle? Was it fit that I should assume that either the object or the effect of the Reform Bill has been to preclude 
all hope of a successful appeal to the good sense and calm judgement of the people, and so fetter the prerogative of the 
Crown, that the King has no free choice among his subjects, but must select his Ministers from one section, and from one 
section only, of public men? 
I have taken another course, but I have not taken it without deep and anxious consideration as to the probability that my 
opinions are so far in unison with those of the constituent body of the United Kingdom as to enable me, and those with 
whom I am about to act, and whose sentiments are in entire concurrence with my own, to establish such a claim upon 
public confidence as shall enable us to conduct with vigour and success the government of this country. 
I have the firmest convictions that that confidence cannot be secured by any other course than that of a frank and explicit 
declaration of principle; that vague and unmeaning professions of popular opinion may quiet distrust for a time, may 
influence this or that election but that such professions must ultimately and signally fail, if, being made, they are not 
adhered to, or if they are inconsistent with the honour and character of those who made them. 
Now I say at once that I will not accept power on the condition of declaring myself an apostate from the principles on 
which I have heretofore acted. At the same time, I never will admit that I have been, either before or after the Reform Bill, 
the defender of abuses, or the enemy of judicious reforms. I appeal with confidence in denial of the charge, to the active 
part I took in the great question of the currency - in the consolidation and amendment of the Criminal Law - in the revisal 
of the whole system of Trial by Jury - to the opinions I have professed, and uniformly acted on, with regard to other 
branches of the jurisprudence of this country - I appeal to this as a proof that I have not been disposed to acquiesce in 
acknowledged evils, either from the mere superstitious reverence for ancient usages, or from the dread of labour or 
responsibility in the application of a remedy. 
But the Reform Bill, it is said, constitutes a new era, and it is the duty of a Minister to declare explicitly - first, whether he 
will maintain the Bill itself, secondly whether he will act on the spirit in which it was conceived. 
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With respect to the Reform Bill itself, I will repeat now the declaration I made when I entered the House of Commons as a 
member of the Reformed Parliament - that I consider the Reform Bill a final and irrevocable settlement of a great 
constitutional question - a settlement which no friend to the peace and welfare of this country would attempt to disturb, 
either by direct or by insidious means. 
Then, as to the spirit of the Reform Bill, and the willingness to adopt and enforce it as a rule of government: if, by adopting 
the spirit of the Reform Bill, it be meant that we are to live in a perpetual vortex of agitation; that public men can only 
support themselves in public estimation by adopting every popular impression of the day, - by promising the instant 
redress of anything which anybody may call an abuse - by abandoning altogether that great aid of government - more 
powerful than either law or reason - the respect for ancient rights, and the deference to prescriptive authority; if this be the 
spirit of the Reform Bill, I will not undertake to adopt it. But if the spirit of the Reform Bill implies merely a careful review of 
institutions, civil and ecclesiastical, undertaken in a friendly temper combining, with the firm maintenance of established 
rights, the correction of proved abuses and the redress of real grievances, - in that case, I can for myself and colleagues 
undertake to act in such a spirit and with such intentions. 
Such declarations of general principle are, I am aware, necessarily vague: but in order to be more explicit, I will endeavour 
to apply them practically to some of those questions which have of late attracted the greater share of public interest and 
attention. 
I take first the inquiry into Municipal Corporations: 
It is not my intention to advise the Crown to interrupt the process of that inquiry, nor to transfer the conduct of it from those 
to whom it was committed by the late Government. For myself, I gave the best proof that I was not unfriendly to the 
principle of inquiry, by consenting to be a member of that Committee of the House of Commons on which it was originally 
devolved. No report has yet been made by the Commissioners to whom the inquiry was afterwards referred: and until that 
report by made, I cannot be expected to give, on the part of the Government, any other pledge that that they will bestow 
on the suggestions it may contain, and the evidence on which they may be founded, a full and unprejudiced consideration. 
I will, in the next place, address myself to the questions in which those of our fellow-countrymen who dissent from the 
doctrines of the Established Church take an especial interest. 
Instead of making new professions, I will refer to the course which I took upon those subjects when out of power. 
In the first place I supported the measure brought forward by Lord Althorp, the object of which was to exempt all classes 
from the payment of Church-rates, applying in lieu thereof, out of a branch of revenue, a certain sum for the building and 
repair of churches. I never expressed, nor did I entertain, the slightest objection to the principle of a bill of which Lord John 
Russell was the author, intended to relieve the conscientious scruples of dissenters in respect to the ceremony of 
marriage. I give no opinion now on the particular measures themselves: they were proposed by Ministers in whom the 
Dissenters had confidence; they were intended to give relief; and it is sufficient for my present purposes to state that I 
supported them. 
I opposed - and I am bound to state that my opinions in that respect have undergone no change - the admission of 
Dissenters as a claim of right, into the universities; but I expressly declared that if regulations, enforced by public 
authorities superintending the professions of law and medicine, and the studies connected with them, had the effect of 
conferring advantages of the nature of civil privileges on one class of the king's subjects from which another was excluded 
- those regulations ought to undergo modification, with the view of placing all the King's subjects, whatever their religious 
creeds, upon a footing of perfect equality with respect to any civil privilege. 
I appeal to the course which I pursued on those several questions, when office must have been out of contemplation; and 
I ask, with confidence, does that course imply that I was actuated by any illiberal or intolerant spirit towards the Dissenting 
body, or by an unwillingness to consider fairly the redress of any real grievances? 
In the examination of other questions which excited the public interest, I will not omit the Pension List. I resisted - and, 
with the opinions I entertain I should again resist - a retrospective inquiry into pensions granted by the Crown at a time 
when the discretion of the Crown was neither fettered by law nor by the expression of any opinion on the part of the 
House of Commons; but I voted for the Resolution, moved by Lord Althorp, that pensions on the Civil List ought, for the 
future, to be confined to such persons only as have just claims to the royal beneficence, or are entitled to consideration on 
account either of their personal services to the Crown, or of performance of duties to the public, or their scientific or 
literary eminence. On the Resolution which I thus supported as a private Member of Parliament, I shall scrupulously act as 
a Minister of the Crown, and shall advise the grant of no pension which is not in conformity with the spirit and intention of 
the vote to which I was a party. 
Then, as to the great question of Church Reform. On that head I have no new professions to make. I cannot give my 
consent to the alienating of Church property, in any part of the United Kingdom, from strictly ecclesiastical purposes. But I 
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repeat now the opinions that I have already expressed in parliament in regard to the church Establishment in Ireland - that 
if, by an improved distribution of the revenues of the Church, its just influence can be extended, and the true interests of 
the Established religion promoted, all other considerations should be made subordinate to the advancement of objects of 
such paramount importance. 
As to Church property in this country, no person has expressed a more earnest wish than I have done that the question of 
tithe, complicated and difficult as I acknowledge it to be, should, if possible, be satisfactorily settled by means of a 
commutation, founded upon just principles, and proposed after mature consideration. 
With regard to alterations in the laws which govern our Ecclesiastical Establishment, I have had no recent opportunity of 
giving that grave consideration to a subject of the deepest interest; which could alone justify me in making any public 
declaration of opinion. It is a subject which must undergo the fullest deliberation, and into that deliberation the 
Government will enter, with the sincerest desire to remove every abuse that can impair the efficiency of the 
Establishment, to extend the sphere of its usefulness, and to strengthen and confirm its just claims upon the respect and 
affection of the people. 
It is unnecessary for my purpose to enter into any further details. I have said enough, with respect to general principles 
and their practical application to public measures, to indicate the spirit in which the King's Government is prepared to act. 
Our object will be - the maintenance of peace - the scrupulous and honourable fulfilment, without reference to their 
original policy, of all existing engagements with Foreign Powers - the support of public credit - the enforcement of strict 
economy - the just and impartial consideration of what is due to all interests - agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial. 
Whatever may be the issue of the undertaking in which I am engaged, I feel assured that you will mark, by a renewal of 
your confidence, your approbation of the course I have pursued in accepting office. I enter upon the arduous duties 
assigned to me with the deepest sense of the responsibilities they involve, with great distrust of my own qualifications for 
their adequate discharge, but at the same time with a resolution to persevere, which nothing could inspire but the strong 
impulse of public duty, the consciousness of upright motives, and the firm belief that the people of this country will so far 
maintain the prerogative of the King, as to give to the Ministers of his choice, not an implicit confidence, but a fair trial. 
I am, Gentlemen, 
With affectionate regard, 
Most faithfully yours, 
Robert Peel. 
Source: Bloy Marjorie, The Peel Web, A Web of English History, www.historyhome.co.uk/peel/politics/tam2.htm, last 
accessed 17 Dec 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
